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Abstract
The relationships between early-life adversity, educational attainment, and subsequent
health have been the focus of much sociological research. Questions remain, however,
regarding whether and under what conditions one can recover from initial disadvantages,
why education is persistently associated with health, and to what extent selection and
turning points account for the long-arm of early-life adversities. This dissertation sheds
light on these questions by examining children of the Chinese Cultural Revolution (CR),
who came of age during the turbulent decade of the Cultural Revolution (1966-76), when
colleges were closed, school quality deteriorated, the state intervened to sever the inter-
generational transmission of educational advantage, and approximately 17 million urban
youth—mostly secondary school graduates—were sent to rural areas to do manual labor.
First, I use the 2003 Chinese General Social Survey to show that life courses are not set
early in life; members of the CR cohort compensate for their initial educational loss by
returning to school at later ages at a rate much higher than adjacent cohorts. Parental
education matters more for members of the CR cohort in facilitating school reentry,
reflecting the early-life discrimination of high-status families during the Cultural Revo-
lution. Party members are more apt to return, suggesting party-sponsored patronage,
and their advantages are most pronounced among members of the CR and post-CR
cohorts. Next, using the Cultural Revolution as a natural experiment and the unique
Chinese institutional arrangements as a single-party state society, I construct two tests
to assess three theoretical perspectives dominant in the education-health literature: spu-
rious correlation, human capital, and fundamental cause theory. Drawing on the 1994
State and Life Chances in Urban China Survey, the 2002 Chinese Household Income
Project, and the 2010 China Family Panel Studies, both tests provide strong support
for but also complicate fundamental cause theory, showing that access to resources is
the key underlying the educational gradient in health, while suggesting the specific form
could di↵er across societies. Lastly, based on life history data collected from the 1994
State and Life Chances in Urban China Survey, I investigate midlife consequences of
the rustication (“sent down”) experience. Duration of time spent in rural areas and
cohort membership combine to shape midlife health, with health disadvantage mostly
1
borne by members of the trailing-edge CR cohort who lived in rural areas for longer
than 5 years. Results from propensity score analysis indicate a selection process; the
rustication policy became less severely implemented later (1972-1976) in the Cultural
Revolution, hence those who were sent to rural areas and stayed there for a long time
from the trailing-edge CR cohort were disadvantaged in many other ways, accounting
for their poorer subsequent health. Taken together, this dissertation highlights the roles
of the state, institutional arrangements, and historical timing in the shaping of educa-
tional attainment, as well as the relationships between early-life adversity, education,
and health.
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Chapter 1
Introduction and Overview
Decades of sociological research on health have uncovered the following two themes (see
Figure 1.1):
[Figure 1.1 about here]
First, education brings strong health benefits (Arrow 2 of Figure 1.1). Better ed-
ucated persons report higher levels of health, su↵er fewer diseases, and die at older
ages (Adler et al., 1994; Deaton and Paxson, 2001; Elo and Preston, 1996; Kitagawa
and Hauser, 1973; Link and Phelan, 1995; Meara et al., 2008; Mirowsky and Ross,
2003). Indeed, the relationship between educational attainment and health is one of the
strongest links in social sciences. There exists a large body of evidence supporting that
education is consequential in structuring inequality in health over the life course across
time and place (e.g., Adler et al., 1994; Deaton and Paxson, 2001; Elo and Preston,
1996; Kitagawa and Hauser, 1973; Link and Phelan, 1995; Meara et al., 2008; Mirowsky
and Ross, 2003; Warren, 2009). While the major causes of mortality have changed from
infectious disease to chronic conditions, for example, educational disparities in health
have either persisted or increased (Lauderdale, 2001; Link and Phelan, 1995; Lynch,
2003; Pappas et al., 1993). The more educated are more likely to live longer, not just in
the United States, but also in Britain (Marmot et al., 1991), Denmark (Arendt, 2005),
Israel (Manor et al., 2000), Sweden (Torssander and Erikson, 2010) and other Western
and Eastern European countries (Shkolnikov et al., 1998). The powerful role of edu-
cation in determining health-related outcomes in the United States and other Western
countries has motivated some scholars to refer to education as a “fundamental cause”
1
2(Link and Phelan, 1995) or “root cause” (Mirowsky and Ross, 2003, 31) of health.
Second, early-life adversities have unfavorable consequences for subsequent health
(Arrow 4 of Figure 1.1). Researchers have increasingly adopted a life-course perspec-
tive realizing that adult health is the long-term outcome of a range of childhood con-
ditions and experiences (Ben-Shlomo and Kuh, 2002; Blackwell et al., 2001; Elo and
Preston, 1992; Hayward and Gorman, 2004; Preston et al., 1998). A number of early
life conditions—exposure to adverse conditions in utero, nutritional deficits, poverty,
and stressful family conditions—have been shown to have far-reaching associations with
mortality and a range of chronic conditions such as glucose intolerance, dyslipidemia,
hypertension, and cardiovascular disease in adulthood (Barker, 1998; Ben-Shlomo and
Kuh, 2002; Blackwell et al., 2001; Elo and Preston, 1992; Hayward and Gorman, 2004;
Roseboom et al., 2000; Stanner et al., 1997). In terms of how these adverse childhood
circumstances extend their long arms, Preston et al. (1998) summarize four ways: (1) di-
rectly and negatively (e.g., a physiological “scarring” e↵ect), (2) directly and positively
(an acquired immunity e↵ect), (3) indirectly and negatively (cumulative advantage and
disadvantage), and (4) indirectly and positively (a selection process in which children in
adverse circumstances “escape” because they are unusually robust and hence survive to
older ages). Among the four, an “indirect and negative” explanation has been bolstered
by much empirical research (e.g., Hayward and Gorman, 2004; Lundberg, 1993; O’Rand
and Hamil-Luker, 2005; Preston et al., 1998).
1.1 Children of the Cultural Revolution
Guided by these two themes, this dissertation examines a Chinese cohort whose op-
portunity to receive an on-time higher education was lost, with many sent to rural
areas—where living conditions were harsh—when they graduated from high school.
This cohort was created by the Chinese Cultural Revolution (1966-76), a major state
initiative to reverse the traditional social hierarchy by penalizing intellectuals (Bern-
stein, 1977; Davis, 1992; Deng and Treiman, 1997; Esherick et al., 2006; Pepper, 1991;
Tsou, 1999; Unger, 1982; Zhou et al., 1996), for example, not letting their children go
to college and even sending them and their children to work in the countryside. This
exogenous and sudden system change fundamentally altered the life trajectories of a
3whole cohort who moved into adolescence and early adulthood (turned age 19) during
that period, now constituting approximately 15% of the Chinese urban population (as
of 2015 ages 58 to 68).
“Rarely are changes so localized in either age or time that their burden falls exclu-
sively on the shoulders of one cohort,” said Ryder (1965, 847). The Cultural Revolution
cohort, however, seems to fit exactly into that category. First, their opportunities for
obtaining a college diploma were lost because the educational system in urban China
came to a halt during the decade-long Cultural Revolution, with colleges ceasing nor-
mal recruitment for up to ten years (Deng and Treiman, 1997; Pepper, 1991; Unger,
1980, 1982; Zhou et al., 1998). Second, children of this cohort from high SES families
experienced a prolonged assault due to the top leaders’ inherent skepticism towards
intellectuals, and as such, the society was stood on its head, with the better educated
being the least advantaged social group in terms of their social status and life chances
(Davis, 1992; Deng and Treiman, 1997; Zhou et al., 1998). Third, approximately 17
million urban youth from this cohort (about a third) were sent to rural areas to “learn
from the peasants;” most of them returned home eventually, but many did so only after
a period of up to ten years (Bernstein, 1977; Bonnin and Horko, 2013; Zhou and Hou,
1999).
The gloomy life chances of the Cultural Revolution cohort have been the focus of
several scholarly investigations (Chen, 1999; Davis, 1992; Davis-Friedmann, 1985; Deng
and Treiman, 1997; Hung and Chiu, 2003; Lin, 2013; Pepper, 1991; Qian and Hodson,
2011; Unger, 1980, 1982; Xie et al., 2008; Zang, 2000; Zhou and Hou, 1999), but this
body of research has focused exclusively on socioeconomic outcomes such as education,
employment, and earnings. No study has attempted to systematically examine the long-
run impacts on an important well-being component—health—for adults who as children
grew up during the Cultural Revolution. Given the well-established relationships be-
tween education, early-life adversities, and health in the existing literature, there are
strong theoretical reasons to expect worse adult health for this cohort, because of their
interrupted education and youth time spent in rural areas doing manual labor. But is
that actually the pattern in the empirical data?
41.2 The Puzzle
I find members of the Cultural Revolution cohort do not fare worse in health as older
adults compared with adjacent cohorts (coming both before and after them). As can be
seen in Figure 1.2, net of the aging e↵ect that reflects a biological process, mortality and
self-reported health exhibit little fluctuation from the pre-Cultural Revolution cohort
to the Cultural Revolution cohort and on to the post-Cultural Revolution cohort. Age-
adjusted models show similar results; di↵erences in the cohort coe cients never reach
statistical significance in those models.
[Figure 1.2 about here]
How to account for this inconsistency between theoretical expectations and empiri-
cal findings? Drawing on data collected from the 1994 State and Life Chances in Urban
China Survey, the 2002 Chinese Household Income Project, the 2003 Chinese General
Social Survey, and the 2010 China Family Panel Studies, my three analytic chapters
o↵er detailed accounts with the overarching goal to understand why the Cultural Revo-
lution did not translate into poorer health for individuals who came of age during that
tumultuous decade.
1.3 Chapter Overviews
Chapter 2: Education Delayed but Not Denied: The Chinese Cultural Revolution Cohort
Returning to School
This chapter targets Arrow 1 in Figure 1.1 by asking: are individuals’ life courses
“set” early in life and continue relatively una↵ected by external conditions and contexts?
Or are individuals able to somehow reverse early adversities when they have opportu-
nities to do so? What characteristics—in terms of social origins, structural locations,
and life histories—di↵erentiate those who return to school and those who do not? The
unique life experiences of the Cultural Revolution cohort o↵er an ideal setting to address
life course assumptions about the role of early disadvantage and individual agency. Pre-
vious studies have shown considerable educational loss of those who were high-school
or college age during the Cultural Revolution (e.g., Deng and Treiman, 1997; Pepper,
1991; Unger, 1980, 1982). This chapter examines the undoing of educational loss when
coming of age during China’s Cultural Revolution by returning to college at later ages.
5Drawing on life-history data with detailed measures of educational experience, I con-
sider the di↵erential rates of returning to school at a later point in time across cohorts,
as well as how cohort membership conditions predictors of a return to school.
My analysis shows that, in the aftermath of the extraordinary and pervasive school
disruption during the Cultural Revolution, individuals compensate for their initial dis-
advantages by returning to college when there are institutional opportunities (the surge
of adult education since the 1980s and party-sponsored patronage) permitting them to
do so. The odds of returning are higher among members of the Cultural Revolution
cohort than those of adjacent cohorts; the actual human capital loss due to the Cul-
tural Revolution, therefore, is less severe when returning to school is taken into account.
Further, those from intellectual families and those who are party members are partic-
ularly apt to return if they are members of the Cultural Revolution cohort, indicating
that past experience and age-sensitive state policies, as denoted by cohort membership,
shape the interplay between structural constraints and human agency.
Chapter 3: Long-term E↵ects of A Large Shock? The Chinese Cultural Revolution,
College Attainment, and Health
This chapter targets Arrow 2 in Figure 1.1 by confronting a widely-held claim in
health studies that higher education universally promotes better health (Adler et al.,
1994; Deaton and Paxson, 2001; Elo and Preston, 1996; Kitagawa and Hauser, 1973;
Link and Phelan, 1995; Meara et al., 2008; Mirowsky and Ross, 2003). This chapter asks:
what is the relationship between educational attainment and health in China, and how
does the answer shed light on the three dominant theoretical perspectives (i.e., spurious
correlation, human capital theory, fundamental cause theory) regarding this question?
The education-health literature draws on evidence primarily from developed countries
in relatively stable times. By contrast, I consider the relationship between education
and health within specific historical and institutional circumstances in a non-Western
setting.
Using the Cultural Revolution as a natural experiment and China as a strategic
research site with distinct institutional arrangements sheds light on why education mat-
ters for health. Recall the three dominant theoretical perspectives o↵ered to account
for the robust relationship between education and health are: spurious correlation (a
third variable predicts both education and health), human capital (knowledge and skills
6learned in school are key), and fundamental cause theory (access to a wide range of
flexible resources is vital). As pointed out in the existing literature, it is di cult to
empirically distinguish among these three explanations.
I construct two tests to assess these three theoretical perspectives. The first test
exploits the natural experiment of the Chinese Cultural Revolution when colleges were
closed, school quality deteriorated, and the state intervened to sever the intergenera-
tional transmission of educational advantage, creating a cohort with distinct educational
experiences as compared to adjacent cohorts. The second test draws on the unique Chi-
nese institutional arrangement as a single-party state that provides di↵erent levels of
resources to its elite members, to compare health di↵erences between two elite groups:
elites because of their higher education, and elites with both a higher education and
communist party membership. Using three cross-sectional waves of survey data eight
years apart over a span of almost 20 years (1994-2010), both tests support but also
complicate fundamental cause theory, revealing that institutional arrangements that
shape access to resources are important parameters for understanding the powerful link
between education and health.
Chapter 4: Turning Point or Selection? Rustication (Sent-Down) and Midlife Health
of Chinese Cultural Revolution Cohort
Chapter 4 targets Arrows 3 and 4 in Figure 1.1, examining whether and how early-life
adversities translate into health assessed later in life (at 37-47). It does so by unraveling
the rustication policy, otherwise known as the “up to the mountains and down to the
villages” or the send-down movement that sent children (“the rusticates”) in their late
teens and early twenties to the countryside. How did this large-scale social dislocation
translate into health later in life? There are multiple possibilities. First, it was not a
random but deeply stratified and changing process governing who was pulled to rural
areas (Bonnin and Horko, 2013; Qian and Hodson, 2011; Xie et al., 2008; Zhou and Hou,
1999). Given the dominant ideology during the initial stage of the Cultural Revolution
(1966-71), children born into advantaged families (parents being intellectuals or cadres)
and children with better education (middle or high school as opposed to primary school)
were more likely to be sent to rural areas. But the later stage of the Cultural Revolution
(1972-76) was characterized as one of resumption of cadre power and return to pre-
CR social order. The composition of those who were uprooted, therefore, could di↵er
7depending on when individuals were sent. Second, the actual “journeys” taken by the
rusticates might matter (Elder, 2003). Living conditions in rural China were harder
than in urban areas: housing was inferior by urban standards, and employment was
largely limited to labor intensive agriculture. On the other hand, given the accentuated
role of personality and agency in di cult environments, the rusticates might have been
forced to become more adaptive in order to acquire the skills necessary to their survival,
which might promote subsequent health later in their life course. Third, the rustication
experience possibly permeates into midlife health through its influences on life chances
outcomes when the youth returned to their home cities. The days spent in rural areas
likely delayed and hurt their entire social lives later on: marriage, family, and jobs
(Chen, 1999; Hung and Chiu, 2003; Qian and Hodson, 2011; Zhou and Hou, 1999),
which may have had health consequences.
Through mapping midlife health with individual characteristics prior to rustication,
their experiences in rural areas, and their life chances subsequent to home return, my
findings reveal two important patterns. First, it is not whether one was sent to rural
areas—but how long one stayed there—that predicts midlife health, and this association
is dependent on cohort membership. Members of the trailing-edge Cultural Revolution
cohort who stayed in rural arrears for longer than 5 years are the biggest losers in
terms of health outcomes. Second, using propensity score matching, it turns out that
this group’s health disadvantage reflects a selection process at least. That is, it is
unobserved disadvantages that sent this group to rural areas and prevented them from
returning to cities early on that led to their poorer health. By contrast, what happened
during and following the rustication journey explained little variation in health.
1.4 Significance
My dissertation makes important contributions to the field of medical sociology and life
course studies. It adds to the lively debate regarding why education matters for health
by examining a country with distinct institutional arrangements and which underwent
one of the largest social experiments (Cultural Revolution) in human history. By doing
so, it sheds new light on the importance of institutional arrangements and the historical
period within which educational attainment is embedded in shaping health outcomes.
8Through three separate sets of analysis, this dissertation also provides a rich empirical
account of the interplay between structural constraints, selection, and human agency,
illustrating how individuals bring their biographical pasts as resources and constraints
but also opportunities for the shaping of their life courses. Taken as a whole, this disser-
tation provides a much-needed contribution to health research and ongoing sociological
debates regarding the ties linking family background, education, health, and the life
course.
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Figure 1.1: Analytic Framework
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Chapter 2
Education Delayed but Not
Denied: The Chinese Cultural
Revolution Cohort Returning to
School
Abstract
Previous studies have shown the disruptive e↵ect of the Chinese Cultural Revolution
(1966-76, CR) on the educational attainment of the Culture Revolution cohort—who
came of age during that turbulent decade—due to college closings. What is less known
is whether this cohort compensates for their initial educational destruction by returning
to school at later ages. Drawing on detailed life history data collected from the 2003
Chinese General Social Survey of three Chinese cohorts who turned age 19 in di↵erent
historical periods (pre-CR, CR, and post-CR cohort), this paper investigates to what
extent cohort membership is directly associated with returning to school and moderates
the e↵ects of gender, social origins, and political credentials in returning to school. Cox
proportional hazards models show that members of the CR cohort are considerably
more likely to return to school from their late 20s on compared with adjacent cohorts,
thereby narrowing but not closing their educational gap. Women are less likely to
return compared with men regardless of cohort membership. Parental education does
11
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not predict college reentry rates for members of the pre- and post-CR cohort, but does
for members of the Cultural Revolution cohort, reflecting their early-life discrimination
during the Cultural Revolution and their regained resources following it. Party members
are more apt to return, suggesting party-sponsored patronage, and their advantages are
most pronounced among members of the CR and post-CR cohorts. Taken together, this
study highlights the roles of the state and historical timing in the shaping of decisions
around returning to school.
2.1 Introduction
Schooling decisions made in later life tend to be overlooked in conventional studies of
educational attainment. Classic human capital theory predicts that individuals make
schooling investments as early as possible to minimize opportunity costs and to recoup
their educational investment over a longer period of time (Becker, 1970). The sta-
tus attainment theoretical framework focuses on education attained before adulthood
(Blau and Duncan, 1967; Bourdieu and Passeron, 1977; Coleman, 1988; Featherman and
Hauser, 1978). Whether social origins continue to influence education obtained later in
adulthood has been less studied (Elman and O’Rand, 2007).
However, life course scholars frequently view a return to school as a transition located
within the context of linked individual, family, and occupation pathways. This focus on
individual biographies, nevertheless, does not capture the roles of historical timing and
the state (for notable exceptions, see Bradburn et al., 1995; Elder, 1987).
Situated in the context of China, this paper examines returning to school among
members of three Chinese cohorts who had di↵erent early-life educational experiences
due to rapidly shifting state policies. During China’s Cultural Revolution (1966-76),
national college entrance examinations ceased to be held from 1966 to 1971. When
colleges began extremely restricted recruitment in 1972, only those of working-class
origins were favored (Pepper, 1991; Unger, 1982). The Cultural Revolution (1966-76)
thus created a cohort who moved into adolescence and early adulthood (i.e., turned
age 19) during a decade when the chance to receive a higher education was severely
reduced and when conventional social stratification mechanisms were upended (Davis,
1992; Deng and Treiman, 1997; Giles et al., 2008; Meng et al., 2007; Unger, 1982;
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Zhou et al., 1998, 1996). By comparison, those who came of age before and after the
Cultural Revolution, the pre-CR and post-CR cohort, were not subject to such a state
intervention that deliberately demolished early-life advantages conferred by families;
they were largely able to climb the educational ladder on time.
Given the unique early-life experience of this Cultural Revolution cohort (born 1947-
1957, ages 9-19 in 1966), a set of theoretically interesting questions follows. First, in the
aftermath of schooling disruption at conventional ages, do individuals take subsequent
actions to make up for their educational losses? Although some studies have examined
returns to school of those who were once sent to rural areas (Bonnin and Horko, 2013;
Deng and Treiman, 1997; Xie et al., 2008; Zhou and Hou, 1999), that episode of returning
occurred before the early 1980s, when the Chinese adult education system had yet to
enjoy full-fledged growth. Further, no study has made between-cohort comparisons to
assess the di↵erential magnitudes of returning to college across cohorts. This paper
is the first to systematically examine whether the CR cohort narrowed or even closed
its educational gap relative to adjacent cohorts in the years following the Cultural
Revolution.
The second research question asks: Do social origins, gender, and party membership
predict returning to school, and are these relationships contingent on cohort member-
ship? First, cohort membership captures di↵erential early-life experiences due to state
interventions. Unlike what is typically observed (patterns of educational stratification
evident by the early 20s), members of the CR cohort began their early adulthood with
considerable homogeneity in educational levels, due to the massive state intervention.
Deng and Treiman (1997) showed that the association between father’s socioeconomic
status and son’s educational attainment was dramatically weakened for the CR cohort
(using the 1982 census, when they were ages 21-34). Gender inequality in education is
also found to be smallest for this cohort (Hannum and Xie, 1994). But that is not the
end of the story. The state intervention to eliminate educational inequality might have
been successful at first when members of the CR cohort were in early adulthood, but
educational inequality within this cohort could intensify and gradually become compa-
rable to that found in other cohorts in later life stages. Second, cohort membership is
characterized by individuals being in di↵erent life stages when age-sensitive policies are
implemented. With its shifting focus modernizing China after the Cultural Revolution,
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the state aimed to build a young and highly educated workforce. One way to achieve
this goal was to send its less-educated prote´ge´s back to college to credential them (Dick-
son, 2014; Dickson and Rublee, 2000; Heilmann and Kirchberger, 2010; Li and Walder,
2001). To what extent di↵erent cohorts were a↵ected by this policy, however, has not
been quantitatively evaluated.
In sum, guided by a life course perspective, this paper examines the rates of returning
to school by members of three Chinese cohorts who were at di↵erent life stages during
the decade-long Chinese Cultural Revolution (1966-76) and the subsequent economic
reform era. Doing so makes a number of contributions. First, this study emphasizes the
possibility of human agency and state sponsorship in undoing the harm of large-scale
social disruptions. This is encouraging from a policy perspective, especially for societies
that have undergone drastic social interruptions. Second, it demonstrates that the abil-
ity to catch up is not evenly distributed across social groups. The resurgence of the role
of social origins in educational attainment—even after a decade of deliberate state in-
tervention to eliminate intergenerational transmission of educational advantage—speaks
to the power of social stratification that is strongly entrenched and di cult to change.
Third, along the tradition of using cohort to assess macro-to-micro links (Mayer and
Schoepflin, 1989; Ryder, 1965), this study examines the dynamic interplay of individual
lives and institutions over time, providing concreteness to the importance of historical
timing for educational attainment and collective biographies of cohorts in the decisions
around school reentry. Finally, the results regarding predictors of school reentry are
important for policy development in light of the burgeoning adult education initiative
in China over the last few decades (Lai, 2014).
2.2 Return-to-School: a Life-Course Framing
Two principles from the life course tradition are key to the research reported here.
First, historical timing, captured by cohort membership, figures dominantly in life deci-
sions, including around returning to school. A case in point: The generous educational
benefits provided by the G.I. Bill after World War II led to unprecedented levels of re-
enrollment in post-secondary education by men who served in the armed forces (Elder,
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1987; Marcus, 1986; Nam, 1964; Sampson and Laub, 1996). A parallel pattern was ob-
served for U.S. women born 1923-33, whose rates of returning to school were about four
times that of women in the 1905-16 cohort (Bradburn et al., 1995), possibly motivated
by changing values and aspirations resulting from the women’s movement (Bradburn
et al., 1995; Levin and Levin, 1991). There is reason to expect, therefore, that members
of the Cultural Revolution cohort compensate for their collective early-life adversity by
returning to school later in life.
Second, the state sets key parameters that shape the decision to return to school.
Previous studies of the Western experience typically focus on individual life events:
how being a student places extra burdens on adults (Sweet and Moen, 2007), or how
“life-context motivators” (Kasworm, 2003, 6) such as youngest child entering school
may facilitate going back to school (Hostetler et al., 2006; Sweet and Moen, 2007). But
opportunities, incentives, and constraints around returning to school may well di↵er in
countries with distinct institutional arrangements. In particular, the state may play a
fundamental role in such decisions in China. After the Communist takeover in 1949,
the state and the Chinese Communist Party exercised control over society. As will be
discussed, the state a↵ected the opportunity structure of returning to school through its
shifting educational policies. The specific avenues for adult education also permit the
state to direct these opportunities preferentially to its prote´ge´s. The state also changes
relative incentives to return to school across social groups through policies favoring
one group over another. Understanding these variations sheds light on how the state
produces di↵erent life chances for its members at particular junctures of the biographical
life course and history.
2.3 Unraveling Return-to-School in China
2.3.1 Historical background
The institution of adult higher education experienced remarkable evolutions in China.
Immediately after its establishment in 1949, Communist China created a dual-education
system (borrowing from the Soviet Union) operated under di↵erent divisions of the Min-
istry of Education (Kasworm, 1993; Lai, 2014). The “regular” system recruits gradu-
ating high school students through entrance examinations whereas the “adult” system
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o↵ers programs for out-of-school adult learners. Prior to the Cultural Revolution, the
adult education system focused on remedial basic education provision, for example,
“schools for accelerated education of workers and peasants” that gave priority to adults
of working-class and peasant backgrounds (Deng and Treiman, 1997). When the Cul-
tural Revolution began in 1966, regular college education based on examinations was
put to an end. From 1972 until the end of the Cultural Revolution in 1976, colleges
reopened but entrants were selected exclusively from peasants, workers, and soldiers,
rather than high-school graduates (Bernstein, 1977; Shirk, 1979; Unger, 1982). Con-
sequently, a large majority of youth were denied the opportunity of receiving higher
education during the Cultural Revolution (Chen, 1999; Davis, 1992; Davis-Friedmann,
1985; Deng and Treiman, 1997; Meng and Gregory, 2002; Unger, 1982).
After the Cultural Revolution, regular college admission based on academic merits
resumed from 1977 on. The years 1977-1978 were a period of transition when age limits
for regular college attendance was relaxed to age 30 (Bonnin and Horko, 2013; Lai,
2014). The competition was fierce. In those two years, out of 11.8 million candidates,
merely 680,000 people passed the examination, yielding an admission rate of 5.7% (Liu,
2008, 481-483). Most members of the Cultural Revolution cohort were not able to
enter regular college even with the relaxed age limits. From 1979 on, an age limit of
25 was imposed, cutting most members of the Cultural Revolution cohort out of the
competition for retraining (Bonnin and Horko, 2013; Davis-Friedmann, 1985).
The expansion of adult higher education in the 1980s provided a second chance to
go back to school. Between 1978 and 1998, enrollment in the adult sector grew from
1.4 million to 2.8 million, at an annual rate of 3.5 percent. Associate (junior) colleges
and other types of non-regular college programs (e.g., correspondence, television, and
night colleges) mushroomed, dramatically opening the doors to higher education. These
schools were in general more conveniently located, allowed more flexible scheduling
of courses, and included a variety of forms such as radio and television broadcasts
and evening classes, encouraging many adults to make decisions to go back to school.
Credentials earned through adult education were o cially treated as equivalent to those
earned through the regular schooling system (Ministry of Education, 1984).
In addition to the expanding opportunity structure, the incentive structure for higher
education also changed fundamentally. Education was a dubious resource throughout
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much of Communist China’s history, peaking during the Cultural Revolution when a
higher education was conceived as a liability (Deng and Treiman, 1997; Unger, 1982;
Zhou, 2010). This situation changed from the 1980s on, as China entered a period of
reform from a planned to a market economy. Education became increasingly important
in determining labor market outcomes such as employment and wages in the private
sector. The state also responded by attaching more importance to human capital in
career progression (Zhao and Zhou, 2002); a college diploma, for example, has been
required as the main condition for promotion in government posts since 1983 (Zhu, 1994,
241-246). With the rising importance of education, adult education became a vehicle
purposefully adopted by individuals to adapt to the rapid changes in the economy. The
state and the Party also increasingly sponsored party members and cadres (governmental
o cials) for college-level education in order to satisfy the credentials required for state
jobs (for sponsored mobility, see Li and Walder, 2001).
2.3.2 Cohort Variations
Returning to school in China has received scant attention in the literature. Only Lai
(2014) has quantitatively investigated determinants of college reentry, but his analysis
did not focus on cohort variations. Li and Walder (2001) studied career consequences—
not antecedents—of returning to school. Given the unique experience of the Cultural
Revolution cohort, some scholars examined how those who were sent to rural areas
during the Cultural Revolution returned to school after they went back to their home
cities (Bonnin and Horko, 2013; Deng and Treiman, 1997; Unger, 1982; Xie et al., 2008;
Zhou and Hou, 1999). But these are essentially intra-cohort investigations, e.g., were
those sent to rural areas more likely to return to college compared with their peers who
stayed in cities? What my study aims to discover is whether there are any inter-cohort
di↵erences.
Specifically, I compare the rates of returning to college for members of three cohorts
created based on the historical periods when they turned age 19, the typical age of enter-
ing college (see Figure 2.1): the Pre-CR cohort (born 1930-46, aged 20-36 in 1966), the
Cultural Revolution cohort (born 1947-57, aged 9-19 in 1966), and the Post-CR cohort
(born 1958-72, younger than 9 in 1966). I hypothesize that members of the Cultural
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Revolution cohort should be most likely to return, given their distinctive collective bi-
ographies cutting their education short, as well as their life stages when the opportunity
and incentive structures changed to encourage returning to school.
[Figure 2.1 about here]
These three cohorts were exposed to China’s expansion of adult higher education
and intensification of credentialing at di↵erent life stages. Given that individuals are
increasingly less likely to go back to school as they age (Elman and O’Rand, 2007; Felm-
lee, 1988; Hostetler et al., 2006; Jepsen and Montgomery, 2012; Light, 1995; Taniguchi
and Kaufman, 2007), more recent cohorts should be generally more likely to enroll in a
given historical period. However, collective life histories also matter. Unlike their coun-
terparts in other cohorts who were able to move up the educational ladder in a regular
fashion, a considerable proportion of the Cultural Revolution cohort did not have the
opportunity to achieve their desired educational level at “typical” ages. Therefore, they
are more likely to compensate for this initial loss by returning to college at older ages.
Hypothesis 1: Members of the Cultural Revolution cohort were more likely to return
to college, compared with those from the pre-CR and the post-CR cohort.
2.3.3 Cohort Variations by Class, Gender, and Party Membership
Do social origins continue to influence education in adulthood? Studies conducted in
the West suggest that, although the absence of financial resources may lead adults from
lower classes to delay their education, it is advantaged socioeconomic background that
promotes returning to school (Elman and O’Rand, 2007; Griliches, 1980; Jacob and
Weiss, 2011; Light, 1995; Marcus, 1986; Taniguchi and Kaufman, 2007). For example,
Elman and O’Rand (2007) showed that each additional unit of father’s prestige increases
women’s odds of school reentry by 0.8% and men’s odds by 1.1%, for those ages 29-
61. Cohort may be an important moderator, however; as shown by Elder and Hareven
(1994), military recruits in the 1940s from disadvantaged backgrounds were uniquely
positioned to take advantage of the G.I. Bill to return to school.
Social origins loom large in assessing school reentry in China, a country where regu-
lar college enrollment was far from typical until quite recently. In general, children born
into better-educated families should be more apt to return to school for two reasons.
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First, children from these families have higher educational aspirations, and any mis-
match between their high aspirations and low educational achievements may provide
the impetus to return for a college degree (e.g., Breen and Goldthorpe, 1997). Sec-
ond, members of this advantaged group are more likely to receive resources from their
families—financial and social, as well as higher levels of encouragement. Further, this
social origin di↵erence should be even more pronounced for the Cultural Revolution
cohort. Children from intellectual families have been shown to be the greatest losers
of the Cultural Revolution due to the biased educational policies during the decade
(Broaded, 1983; Deng and Treiman, 1997; Giles et al., 2008; Zhou et al., 1998); they
would logically seek to complete their educations.
Hypothesis 2:
2a: Children from better-educated families are more likely to return to college than
those from less advantaged families.
2b: Children in the Cultural Revolution cohort from better-educated families are more
likely to return to college, compared with their counterparts from other cohorts.
One theme emerging from Western studies on returned students is that women’s
life course trajectories in general and their educational pathways in particular are more
likely to be disrupted due to family-related life events (Bradburn et al., 1995; Elman
and O’Rand, 2004, 2007; Felmlee, 1988; Hostetler et al., 2006; Jepsen and Montgomery,
2012; Levin and Levin, 1991; Setftersten and Lovegreen, 1998; Taniguchi and Kaufman,
2007). In the context of China, Treiman (2013) showed that the gender gap for primary
education began to close after 1950; for higher education, women’s disadvantage did not
close until the 1980s (also see Zhou et al. 1998). But less is known regarding gender
di↵erences in returning to college.
I hypothesize that Chinese men are more likely to return to school. Although gender
equality has been an explicit policy goal in China, traditional gender ideologies remain
deeply rooted in the Chinese society (Shu and Bian, 2003), with women socialized to be
domestic (Chen, 2005) and expected to assume most of the burdens of household and
family (Whyte and Parish, 1985), while men are expected to succeed in the workplace.
Indeed, traditional beliefs about the inherent biological and intellectual inferiority of
women are still popular and can even be found among college-educated women (Attane´,
2012; Honig and Hershatter, 1988; Wolf, 1987). In the labor market, men are favored
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over women, provided with more flexibility to make job changes and other adjustments
(Shu and Bian, 2003). Chinese women are therefore less likely to perceive the need or
receive necessary support to upgrade their human capital for upward mobility.
Any gender di↵erences may be further moderated by cohort. In particular, I expect
men from the Cultural Revolution cohort are more likely to return to school. Compared
with men from other cohorts, men’s advantage in education over women is smallest for
the Cultural Revolution cohort given the egalitarian policies adopted during that decade
(Hannum and Xie, 1994). But the considerably weakened gender egalitarian policies
since the economic reform era (Zhao and Zhou, 2002) may have propelled men from
this cohort—more than men from other cohorts or women from the Cultural Revolution
cohort—to make up for their earlier educational deprivation.
Hypothesis 3:
3a: Chinese women return to school at a slower rate compared with men.
3b: Compared with the pre- and post-CR cohorts, women’s disadvantage in returning
to school as compared with men is most pronounced for those in the Cultural Revolution
cohort.
Lastly, a unique contributing factor for returning to school in the Chinese institu-
tional context is connection with the party and state apparatus. Proposed by Li and
Walder (2001), the state and the Communist party systematically send its members back
to school to improve their ability to perform in an administrative post or to merely serve
a symbolic purpose of legitimating those without educational qualifications chosen for
leadership. Hence, party members should on average be more apt to return to college
compared with non-members. Again, cohort membership moderates this relationship,
given the age preference the state sets regarding who is to be sent back to college. After
the Cultural Revolution, the state devoted much energy to rebuilding a regular cadre
system, and placed increasing importance on human capital in promotion, policies and
practices, even though at that time its members were generally too old and too poorly
educated. In 1980, for example, only 43% of the leaders of central government agencies
had a college degree, while 24% had only attended middle school (Heilmann and Kirch-
berger, 2010). Consequently, the state implemented new criteria for the recruitment of
members and the appointment and promotion of cadres, emphasizing youth and educa-
tion (Dickson and Rublee, 2000). Given the push to get middle-aged members to boost
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their academic credentials in order to be eligible for many cadre posts (Dickson, 2014),
members of the Cultural Revolution cohort were in a better position to take advantage
of this policy tilted towards their benefits.
Hypothesis 4:
4a: Party members return to school at a faster rate compared with non-party mem-
bers.
4b: Compared with the pre- and post-CR cohorts, party members’ advantage in re-
turning to school is largest among those in the Cultural Revolution cohort.
2.4 Methods
2.4.1 Data and Sample
I draw on data collected from the 2003 Chinese General Social Survey (CGSS), a na-
tionally representative survey conducted in urban China with detailed educational and
job histories, recording beginning and ending years of each schooling level and each job
episode with possible disruptions in between. I removed a few respondents (from all
cohorts) who had at least an associate college degree before age 25, reasoning that these
individuals would have no incentive to return to school. The size of the final analytic
sample is 3765.
2.4.2 Measures
Outcomes
Timing of Returning to School. A respondent is defined as having experienced the event
of a “return to school” if the following two criteria are satisfied: (1) the respondent
reported (associate) college activity between age 25 and 45, regardless of subsequent
graduation status (the great majority who returned graduated), and (2) there is at
least a 2-year gap between the return-to-school episode and any prior educational expe-
rience. This definition takes account of (1) the discontinuity in schooling as emphasized
in return-to-school, (2) the normative age routine of educational activities, typically
completed by the early 20s or even earlier in China, as well as (3) the age limit for
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because returning at even older ages may be returning to colleges specifically designed
for elders’ enrichment. Respondents who had not returned to school by the survey date
are right-censored.
Explanatory Variables
Cohort is based on the calendar year when respondents turned 19, the typical age for
beginning college. The Cultural Revolution cohort consists of those who came of age
during the Cultural Revolution (born 1947-57, ages 9-19 at the beginning of the Cul-
tural Revolution, and ages 46-56 in the 2003 CGSS). This whole cohort’s opportunities
to receive a normal college education were lost or at least disrupted, due to the cessation
of college admission throughout that decade and the rustication policy that sent many
high school children to rural areas (Bernstein, 1977; Bonnin and Horko, 2013; Zhou and
Hou, 1999). The Pre-CR cohort refers to those who turned 19 during China’s consol-
idation period, between the establishment of People’s Republic of China in 1949 and
the beginning of Cultural Revolution (born 1930-46, ages 20-36 at the beginning of the
Cultural Revolution, and ages 57-73 in the 2003 CGSS). The Post-CR cohort is defined
as those who came of age after the Cultural Revolution and before the intensification
of urban China’s economic reform in 1992 (born 1958-72, younger than 9 in 1966, and
ages 31-45 in the 2003 CGSS).
I use parental education to measure respondents’ social origins, the focal explanatory
variable in Hypothesis 2. This is a dichotomous variable measuring the highest education
of either parent, with less than high school used as the reference.
Gender, the principal predictor in Hypothesis 3, di↵erentiates men from women (=
1).
Party membership is used to evaluate any di↵erences in school reentry between those
a liated with the Communist party and those who are not. This is the focal predictor
for Hypothesis 4.
Covariates
I control for demographic characteristics including age, age squared, and marital status
(married = 1, time-varying variable). Several work-related variables—all varying with
time—are controlled for: cumulative duration of unemployment or being out of the labor
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force during the last five years, cumulative job experience, and occupation (administra-
tive cadres, professionals, ordinary workers, self-employed, and out of the labor force).
Prior educational level has five levels measuring respondents’ highest educational degree
obtained before age 25: less than middle school (reference), middle school, academic-
track high school, and vocational-track high school. Rustication experience measures
whether or not respondents were ever sent to rural areas. The rustication movement
reached its peak during the Cultural Revolution, but it was initiated as early as the
1950s and lasted until the late 1970s (Bernstein, 1977; Bonnin and Horko, 2013; Zhou
and Hou, 1999). Province dummies are included in all models but their estimates are
omitted from tables for simplicity (results available upon request).
2.4.3 Analysis Plan
I use the semi-parametric Cox proportional hazard model because of its flexibility and
fewer distributional assumptions than what are required in parametric models (Klein
and Moeschberger, 2003). The general form of the proportional hazard model is given
as:
h(t) = h0 exp(A(t)B), (2.1)
where h(t) represents the hazard rate of returning to school at age t, h0 is an
unspecified baseline rate, and B is the model parameter to be estimated representing
the possible “influences” of a covariate vector A(t) on the hazard rate.
The analytic time is set up using a clock based on historical time. By comparing
returning to school of di↵erent cohorts in the same historical period, this time clock is
able to reveal any cohort e↵ects due to life/career stage di↵erences. All analyses are
weighted to represent the Chinese urban population.
2.5 Results
2.5.1 Descriptive Summaries
About eight percent of the sample returned to college at some point between age 25
and the CGSS in 2003, when respondents were between ages 31 and 73. Returners
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di↵er from non-returners in several aspects, as shown in Table 2.1, first for the overall
sample and then disaggregated by cohort. For the three focal predictors, women are,
as expected, less likely to return (9% men vs. 6% women are returners, p < .001).
More (30% to 16%, p < .001) returners’ than non-returners’ parents had a high school
education. Further, party members were much more apt to return; almost 13% party
members returned to school, while the corresponding figure is only 6% among those not
a liated with the party (p < .001).
[Table 2.1 about here]
Cohort membership is an important dimension in assessing these di↵erences. First,
the Cultural Revolution cohort is overrepresented in the returners group, comprising
36% of all returners (vs. 30% among non-returners, p < .05), providing initial ev-
idence supporting Hypothesis 1. Second, several di↵erences between returners and
non-returners as sketched above are contingent on cohort membership. Di↵erences
in parental education, for example, are noticeable across cohorts: The higher rate of
returning to school among adult children of educated parents (had at least a high school
degree) is most pronounced for those in the Cultural Revolution cohort.
In terms of family and work characteristics, returners were far less likely to be
married at age 25 (47% among returners vs. 62% among non-returners, p < .001) while
more attached to the labor market, with fewer unemployment or out-of-the-labor-force
episodes (.36 vs. 1.71, p < .001) and having accumulated more job experiences (22
vs. 20, p < .05) when surveyed. In addition, returners are more apt to be cadres
(10% among returners vs. 2% among non-returners, p < .001) or professionals (42%
among returners vs. 13% among non-returners, p < .001) at age 25. Not surprisingly,
returners were more prepared academically before returning, as evidenced by a higher
proportion holding an academic-track high school degree (53% vs. 26%, p < .001).
Finally, individuals who were once sent to rural areas are more likely to return to school
(20% vs. 13%, p < .01).
2.5.2 Predictors of School Reentry: Who is More Likely to Return to
School?
Table 2.2 shows estimates from the Cox proportional hazards model, after taking ac-
count of socio-demographic characteristics, prior educational history, and the rustication
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experience. As expected in Hypothesis 1, members of the pre- and post-CR cohorts lag
behind those in the Cultural Revolution cohort in returning to college; the hazard rates
are 53% (1 - exp[-.763] = .53, p < .05) and 66% (1 - exp[-1.069] = .66, p < .001) lower,
respectively.
[Table 2.2 about here]
Turn to di↵erences by social origins, gender, and party a liation. Although descrip-
tive statistics (Table 2.1) suggest that respondents whose parents hold a high school
degree are more likely to return to school than those with lower-educated parents, such
class di↵erences disappear once other covariates are controlled for. Consistent with Hy-
pothesis 3a, women are significantly less apt to return to college compared with men (1
- exp[-.383] = .32, p < .05). Lastly, as expected in Hypothesis 4a, party members have
significantly faster rates (exp[.693] = 2, p < .001) of going back to school for further
education, compared with those who are not a liated with the party.
Findings pertaining to the other covariates indicate a curvilinear relationship be-
tween age and school reentry, with age predicting increasingly flattening rates of re-
turning to college. Variables measuring respondents’ attachment to the labor market
(employment status, job experience) do not predict school reentry; neither does marital
status. Being in either an administrative or a professional position, as opposed to an
ordinary worker job, promotes the rates of returning to school. Prior educational level
is positively associated with subsequent rates of returning to college. The unique life
experience of being sent to rural areas does not seem to shape going back to school
generally, but does so, (as shown in Model 3 and further discussed in Chapter 4), for
the Cultural Revolution cohort alone.
2.5.3 Cohort Di↵erences in Predictors of School Reentry
Are the relationships between covariates and return-to-school rates shaped by cohort
membership? In this section I model return-to-school rates by cohort (Models 2-4 in
Table 2.2), using interaction models to determine whether any cohort di↵erence reaches
statistical significance.
While no cohort variation is observed for gender di↵erences in school reentry, social
origins matter for the Cultural Revolution cohort only. Whereas having at least one
parent who finished high school is not associated with return-to-college rates for either
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the pre-CR or the post-CR cohort, the association is significantly positive for members
of the Cultural Revolution cohort, for whom parental education more than doubles
return-to-school rates (exp[1.084] = 2.96, p < .001). An interaction model indicates
that such a cohort di↵erence in the association between parent’s education and school
return rates is statistically significant (p < .05 compared with pre-CR cohort, and p <
.01 compared with post-CR cohort). Hypothesis 2b is thus supported; family resources
matter more for obtaining a higher education among children of the Cultural Revolution.
I showed previously that party members are more likely to return to college, but
this is only the case for the CR (1.128, p < .001) and post-CR cohorts (.734, p <
.01). An interaction model further indicates that, although party members from the
CR cohort are more likely to return to college compared with party members from
the pre-CR cohort (p < .001), party members’ rates of going back to school are not
significantly di↵erent between CR and post-CR cohorts. Hypothesis 4b is therefore
partially supported.
2.6 Discussion
Many sociological investigations assess the consequences of social disruptions, providing
valuable insights into the social costs (or benefits) of these events, such as Elder’s classic
study (1974) of the life chances of children who grew up during the Great Depression,
or Mayer’s (1988) research on the e↵ects of World War II on members of West German
cohorts who made the school-to-work transition at that time. This paper draws on the
disruption of the Cultural Revolution in China to address equally important questions
from another angle: do these a↵ected individuals make attempts to make up for their
early-life disadvantage, and if so, what are the facilitating and constraining factors?
Individuals are not merely acted upon by macro-level social influences; they respond
creatively to the constraints generated by even very drastic circumstances (Hitlin and
Elder, 2007). Nevertheless, the ability to compensate for initial disadvantage is not
evenly distributed, but often works in favor of those who are already privileged, thus
perpetuating preexisting stratification patterns.
The protracted school interruption created by the Cultural Revolution (1966-76) in
China represents an unusual episode in human history, and the focus of this paper is
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the imprint of that historical change over 40 years later on the lives of the adults who
came of age during that decade. My findings show that even educational disruptions of
significant duration involving a fairly large number of students may have less striking
consequences than conventional expectations would suggest. One way these children of
the Cultural Revolution could compensate for their weak human capital was to return
to school in their late 20s or even later on in life. Earlier deprivations, therefore, may
not completely foreclose individuals’ later opportunities. Social origins turn out to be a
strong predictor of returning to school only among members of the CR-cohort, with those
from advantaged families more likely to return. As a consequence, the initial success
of the Cultural Revolution in eliminating intergenerational transmission of educational
achievement was attenuated. Women, as hypothesized, are less likely to return than
men, and this gender di↵erence persists for all cohorts. Lastly, a unique Chinese process
reflecting state/party sponsorship is observed, with party members returning to college
at a much faster rate, especially when they are from the CR or post-CR cohorts.
One important contribution of this paper is to give substance to the notion that
individual decisions such as returning to school are shaped by historical shifts in op-
portunity and motivation, as well as collective biography, as marked by their respective
cohort membership. To be sure, several previous studies examined “recovery” from
the Cultural Revolution, but they either used period e↵ects (i.e., before, during, and
after the Cultural Revolution) to investigate the recovery of the state (e.g., Deng and
Treiman, 1997), or limited their focus to those who were uprooted to rural areas to
examine the recovery of the rusticated youth (e.g., Bonnin and Horko, 2013; Xie et al.,
2008; Zhou and Hou, 1999), which accounted for only a third of the Cultural Revolution
cohort. A holistic cohort perspective, therefore, is essential to truly capture the costs
and recoveries of all members exposed to this turbulent decade as they came of age.
By contrasting the Cultural Revolution cohort and the cohorts immediately before and
after it, I find members of the CR cohort are more likely to return than either of the
other two, showing that those most strongly a↵ected by historical shifts are usually per-
sons who are at particular points in their life courses with particular biographies (Elder
et al., 2003). These three cohorts are di↵erentiated by their distinct early life educa-
tional experiences, with the CR-cohort members losing chances of a higher education
at normative ages. Also important are the di↵erent life stages of these three cohorts
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when structural opportunities of adult education shifted and when education became
more critical in the job market in China from the 1980s on. Indeed, the two histori-
cal shifts—adult education expansion and the rising value of education—that rendered
returning to school a desirable choice were experienced by all cohorts, but they were
more likely to translate into actual decisions to return to school among members of the
CR-cohort. This is both because of their prior educational experiences, and because
they were younger (than the pre-CR cohort) when these historical shifts occurred, and
as such, had lower opportunity costs and more time to eventually gain a higher educa-
tional degree.
Social origins enter into the picture of returning to school, but cohort turns out to be
an important moderating factor, reflecting in part shifting educational policies over time.
The pre- and post-CR cohorts were not exposed to as severe class-based discrimination
in school admission as the Cultural Revolution cohort encountered in their early lives.
For these two non-CR cohorts, therefore, children born into better-educated families
were largely able to translate their family background into higher education on time,
thereby sparing them the need to return to school. Their counterparts in the CR cohort,
in contrast, su↵ered greatly in terms of the absence of educational opportunity during
the Cultural Revolution and had to delay their higher education to a later life stage.
Combined, these variations across cohorts and social origins produce a pattern of a
converging inter-cohort di↵erence accompanied by a diverging intra-cohort di↵erence.
On the one hand, individuals in the Cultural Revolution cohort made compensatory
e↵orts in later life to overcome their initial disadvantages in educational achievement.
As a result, the gap between the CR and the pre- or post-CR cohort in college com-
pletion is narrowed (but not closed) as they age. On the other hand, the Cultural
Revolution cohort sees a within-cohort widening of social origins disparities as they age,
compared with the adjacent cohorts. Therefore, although the state intervention during
the Cultural Revolution was successful in creating a cohort who began adult life with
relatively little educational variation (in terms of associate college completion) (Deng
and Treiman, 1997), such equality was gradually replaced by rising inequality. But even
at later ages, the Cultural Revolution cohort still lagged behind other cohorts in college
attainment, and they had lower levels of within-cohort educational inequality, showing
that it is extremely di cult to reverse patterns of educational stratification once a whole
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cohort loses out in early life stages.
Women are significantly disadvantaged in returning to college compared to men
regardless of cohort membership. Despite the Chinese government’s public commitment
to promoting gender equality, it seems there is still a long way to go before women and
men really stand on equal footing. Traditional gender ideology is still deeply rooted in
China, especially with regard to the domestic division of labor (Chen, 2005). Given that
marriage is almost universal among these three cohorts, the dual demands from both
the workplace and home may severely constrain Chinese women’s abilities to add on still
other obligations by returning to school. Further, the state, in the form of sponsors, may
also discriminate by assuming women are more burdened at home, meaning sponsors
are less likely to select them as candidates. The absence of cohort variation in this case
suggests that gendered expectations and bias changed little over the years investigated
(from 1950 to 2003).
In the context of China, the state plays an important role in individuals returning to
school. Not only does it a↵ect opportunity and incentive structures through education
and economic policies, it also directly sends its prote´ge´s back to college. As shown in
this study, party members are far more apt to return, reflecting the sponsored process
(Li and Walder, 2001). Importantly, such party patronage does not apply to di↵erent
cohorts equally. In the aftermath of the Cultural Revolution, the state increasingly
sought people who were loyal, young, and educated when filling o cial positions (Bian
and Logan, 1996; Dickson, 2014). Party members of the Cultural Revolution cohort,
therefore, were among the first beneficiaries of this policy. Also gaining from this policy
are party members from the post-CR cohort, suggesting that what cohort membership
represents in this case is not so much collective biography as life and career stages when
new policies were implemented.
Methodologically, this study adds to the burgeoning literature raising doubts over
the practice of treating educational attainment as a fixed characteristic past early adult-
hood. As is the case in other countries (see Light, 1995; Marcus, 1986; Taniguchi and
Kaufman, 2007), returning to school in China is by no means a rare event. Thus, edu-
cational achievement might well advance as one ages for a substantial proportion of the
population. Relatedly, this study reinforces the importance of incorporating timing (bi-
ographical and historical) in analysis of educational transitions and their consequences
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(see, Elman and O’Rand, 2004; Leigh and Gill, 1997; Light, 1995; Monks, 1997). For
example, one year of schooling received early in life might well have di↵erent implica-
tions than the same schooling earned at age 30 due to variations in quality, remaining
life to recoup the benefits, and signaling e↵ects, etc. This timing e↵ect might matter
even more in China, given that many of the returnees are selected and sponsored by
the state and party so may well follow a distinct career path (Li and Walder, 2001);
additional research is needed to understand ramifications following a return to school
in di↵erent contexts.
The CGSS survey was conducted in 2003; more than a decade has passed since
then, an important limitation. It is possible new patterns might emerge as the cohorts
move into even later life stages. It could be the case that the early-life experience of
the Cultural Revolution cohort is so unique that a considerable proportion of them will
return to school at even older ages than captured here, but the pattern of low enrollment
rates (as found in the U.S) among those in their forties and fifties (Light, 1995) suggests
that this investigation probably captured the prime age window of the return-to-school
event. Nevertheless, future research is needed to provide a more complete picture of
return-to-school behaviors and the consequences for the resources and attainments of
these cohorts in their later life stages, as well as for more recent cohorts. Another
limitation of this paper is its reliance on retrospective data. To what extent the recall
error and measurement error might bias the results is unknown. Lack of more detailed
measures reflecting respondents’ home demands—such as presence of children or adult
care responsibilities—is yet another limitation that future studies could address.
Nevertheless, this study of returning to school fills a research gap in understanding
the life courses of three Chinese cohorts moving to and through adulthood during a
period of dramatic policy shifts, looking specifically at the decision to return to school
over their life courses. It shows that cohort membership, as a key marker of shifting
opportunity and incentive structures as well as shared educational biographies, is an
important parameter to further our understanding of educational attainment and strat-
ification. This study also sheds light on the dynamic processes whereby institutional
forces and individual behaviors intersect to create educational stratification over time.
Future work is needed to yield more insights regarding the complex interplays between
institutions and individual lives as they evolve at other places and in other times.
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Figure 2.1: Life Course Stages and Historical Events in the Post-1949 China: An
Illustration of Three Cohorts
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Table 2.1: Descriptive Statistics, by Cohort Membership and Return-to-School Status,
2003 CGSS
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Table 2.2: Cox Proportional Hazards Models Predicting Returning to School, 2003
CGSS
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Chapter 3
Long-term E↵ects of a Large
Shock? The Chinese Cultural
Revolution, College Attainment,
and Health
Abstract
The relationship between educational attainment and health is one of the strongest
links in social sciences, and yet questions remain why this is the case. There are three
dominant theoretical perspectives to account for such a robust relationship: spurious
correlation, human capital, and fundamental cause theory. These perspectives have
theoretical and practical implications because they point to di↵erent loci of potential
intervention. This paper constructs two tests to assess these three theoretical perspec-
tives. The first test exploits the natural experiment of the Chinese Cultural Revolution
(1966-76) when colleges were closed, school quality deteriorated, and the state inter-
vened to sever the intergenerational transmission of educational advantage, creating a
cohort with distinctly low educational experiences as compared with adjacent cohorts.
The second test draws on the unique Chinese institutional arrangement as a single-
party state society to compare health di↵erences of two elite groups: elites because of
34
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higher education, and elites with both higher education and communist party member-
ship. Using the 1994 State and Life Chances in Urban China Survey, the 2002 Chinese
Household Income Project, and the 2010 China Family Panel Studies, both tests provide
strong support for but also complicate fundamental cause theory. These results chal-
lenge the prevailing wisdom that education has a universal beneficial e↵ect on health,
and emphasize the importance of institutional contexts in the shaping of educational
gradients in health.
3.1 Introduction
The relationship between educational attainment and health is one of the strongest
links in social sciences. There exists a large body of evidence showing that education
is consequential in structuring inequality in health outcomes over the life course across
time and place (e.g., Adler et al., 1994; Deaton and Paxson, 2001; Elo and Preston,
1996; Kitagawa and Hauser, 1973; Link and Phelan, 1995; Meara et al., 2008; Mirowsky
and Ross, 2003; Warren, 2009). While the major causes of mortality have changed from
infectious disease to chronic conditions, for example, educational disparities in health
have either persisted or increased (Lauderdale, 2001; Link and Phelan, 1995; Lynch,
2003; Pappas et al., 1993). The more educated are more likely to live longer, not just in
the United States, but also in Britain (Marmot et al., 1991), Denmark (Arendt, 2005),
Israel (Manor et al., 2000), Sweden (Torssander and Erikson, 2010) and other Western
and Eastern European countries (Shkolnikov et al., 1998). Questions remain, however,
regarding why education matters.
There are at least three dominant theoretical perspectives to account for such a ro-
bust relationship between education and health: spurious correlation (a third variable
predicts both education and health), human capital (knowledge and skills are the key),
and fundamental cause theory (access to a wide range of flexible resources is vital). And
yet it is di cult to distinguish these three explanations. To rule out “third variables”
as a valid explanation, for example, one needs to find a situation in which educational
achievement is exogenously determined. A formal test of the fundamental cause theory,
as another example, requires one to think about a scenario in which educational attain-
ment could be analytically separated from the ability to use socioeconomic resources
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(Phelan et al., 2010).
This paper sheds new light on this old question by examining the relationship be-
tween education and health in China, a country with distinct institutional arrangements
which underwent one of the largest social experiments in human history (the Cultural
Revolution) by the state seeking to intervene in intergenerational mobility. The theo-
retical value of the China case for understanding the educational gradient in health is
twofold. First, as a redistributive economy and a single-party state society, the social
stratification and the rewarding system in People’s Republic of China follows a di↵erent
logic than Western industrialized societies (Bian, 2002; Nee, 1989, 1991, 1996; Zhou,
2010). The state and the Chinese Communist Party play a determining role in allocat-
ing resources; instead of rewarding productivity signaled by human capital, the state
typically privileges those closely connected to the state apparatus as marked by party
membership. Therefore, a college diploma in itself does not guarantee “access to flexi-
ble and multipurpose health-promoting resources” (Link and Phelan, 1995; Link et al.,
2008; Phelan et al., 2004; Phelan and Link, 2005), as what occurs in Western societies.
Second, the Chinese Cultural Revolution (1966-76) produced a naturally occurring
experiment, creating a whole cohort who were subject to distinct opportunity and al-
locative mechanisms of college education, compared with adjacent cohorts (Davis, 1992;
Deng and Treiman, 1997; Qian and Hodson, 2011; Xie et al., 2008; Zhou and Hou, 1999).
The Cultural Revolution cohort, also referred to as the lost generation (Hung and Chiu,
2003) or children of the Cultural Revolution (Zang, 2000; Zhou and Hou, 1999), is de-
fined in this paper as those who turned age 19 during the Cultural Revolution (i.e., born
between 1947 and 1957). A decade-long major social initiative, the Cultural Revolution
severed the intergenerational transmission of advantages by closing colleges (Pepper,
1991; Unger, 1982) and sending intellectuals and their children to work in the country-
side (Zhou and Hou, 1999). Further, because the Cultural Revolution deliberately aimed
at penalizing existing high SES groups (Deng and Treiman, 1997; Walder and Hu, 2009;
Zhou et al., 1996), coming from an advantaged family signaled a “status dishonor” in
obtaining a higher education. Examining subsequent health for members of this cohort,
therefore, sheds light on the key parameter underneath the education-health link.
The aim of this paper is to test three dominant theoretical perspectives in explaining
educational gradients in health: spurious correlation, human capital, and fundamental
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cause theory. It does so by examining the education-health relationship across three
Chinese cohorts divided by the Chinese Cultural Revolution (1966-76). All three cohorts
turned age 19 between the establishment of the People’s Republic of China (1949) and
the intensification of urban China’s economic reform (beginning in 1992). Their life
chances are heavily a↵ected by the unique institutional configurations of China as a
single-party state society, and were subject to dramatically shifting educational policies
that put them at di↵erential odds of getting a higher education (Zhou et al., 1998).
Relying on two di↵erent tests—one based on cohort di↵erences and the other di↵erences
across elite groups—my findings support but also complicate fundamental cause theory,
showing that advantaged access to resources is the key reason why education matters
for health, even though the degree to which education brings about these advantages
might di↵er across societies.
The contribution of the paper is multifold. First, the Chinese society and the Cul-
tural Revolution provide a distinct but ideal research site to assess current Western the-
ories, especially to what extent the education-health relationship holds in societies with
di↵erent institutional arrangements from those in the West. Second, from a method-
ological angle, this paper adds empirical evidence to the lively debate between the
“reductionist” and “structural” school for causal inference (Deaton, 2010a; Heckman,
2010; Imbens, 2010), emphasizing that understanding concrete social mechanisms and
contexts can at times yield more fruitful sociological insight than searching for instru-
mental variables to identify “treatment e↵ects.” Third, distinguishing the three per-
spectives has important policy implications as well, because each points to di↵erent loci
of intervention. The strong supportive evidence for fundamental cause theory reported
in this paper, therefore, suggests that interventions to reduce health disparities should
focus on the social processes that almost universally link socioeconomic status to access
to health-promoting resources.
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3.2 Previous Studies
3.2.1 Theoretical Perspectives on the Educational-Health Relation-
ship
One explanation for the relationship between education and health (see Figure 3.1 for an
illustration) views the education-health link as a spurious correlation. In other words, it
is not education but some omitted variables that are the driving forces of the association
between education and health (Figure 3.1A). Potential candidates of omitted variables
include family background (Power and Hertzman, 1997), native ability (Gottfredson,
2004; Heckman, 2008, but see Link et al., 2008), conscientiousness (Savelyev, 2014),
time preference or future orientation (Fuchs, 1982, but see Cutler and Lleras-Muney,
2010), poor health in early life (Adams et al., 2003; Case et al., 2002; Conley and
Bennett, 2000; Je↵eris et al., 2002), and macro-level life expectancy (Jayachandran and
Lleras-Muney, 2009). These confounders, or “third variables,” lead to both higher levels
of educational attainment and better health, creating between them a spurious link. For
example, there is mounting evidence showing the transmission of educational advantage
from parents to children (Blau and Duncan, 1967; Sewell and Hauser, 1972). Given the
importance of early-life family environments in shaping health (Case and Paxson, 2011;
Cohen et al., 2010), family background might confound the education-health link.
[Figure 3.1 about here]
In contrast to researchers viewing education as a spurious correlate, the other two
theoretical perspectives hold that education is a cause of health, but locate mecha-
nisms in di↵erent places. Human capital theorists highlight the knowledge as well as
the cognitive and non-cognitive skills education brings about (Figure 3.1B). Health
economists, for example, emphasize that education shapes people into better decision
makers (“productive e ciency,” see Grossman, 1972) and that more educated people
have more information about the true nature of health production (“allocative e -
ciency,” see Rosenzweig and Schultz, 1983). From another angle, sociologists Mirowsky
and Ross (2003) argue that education promotes “learned e↵ectiveness,” such that better-
educated persons tend to have greater control over all aspects of their lives, which in
turn improves their health. In sum, proponents of the human capital perspective and
its variants tend to view the beneficial e↵ect of education on health as inherent and
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within education itself.
By contrast, researchers from the third camp argue that health disparities are a
reflection of the unequal social distribution of resources. The most well-known argument
comes from Link and Phelan (Link and Phelan, 1995; Link et al., 2008; Phelan et al.,
2004; Phelan and Link, 2005), who suggest education operates as a fundamental cause
of health, providing individuals with a wide range of serviceable resources, including
money, knowledge, prestige, power and beneficial social connections that can be used to
their health advantage (Figure 3.1C). This perspective predicts education to be a cause
antecedent of health, but, unlike human capital theorists, its core feature centers on the
omnipresent ability of education to bring about health-promoting resources, rather than
education in and of itself. In other words, it is the di↵erential access to and utilization
of resources, rather than education alone, that gives rise to health disparities. Note that
there are two components in fundamental cause theory: individuals as decision-makers
who typically use resources available to maximize their health, and social institutions
that determine how health-promoting resources are allocated. To date, most empirical
tests of the fundamental cause theory focus on the individual end and their agentic
use of advanced medical knowledge and technology (see a review by Freese and Lutfey,
2011), ranging from the release of the Surgeon General’s report on smoking (Rubin
et al., 2014; de Walque, 2004) to the use of Statin (Chang and Lauderdale, 2009) or
Pap smears and mammography (Link et al., 1998), and to technological innovations in
general (Glied and Lleras-Muney, 2008; Goldman and Smith, 2005). In comparison, less
attention has been devoted to the roles of social institutions in deciding who gets what.
Questions emanating from an institutional framing include: What would the education-
health link be under a di↵erent social stratification system? What if the state intervenes
in the stratification system? Cross-country analysis sheds light on this important issue.
A few studies have been conducted among welfare states. Olafsdottir (2007), for exam-
ple, compares the relationship between education and health in the United States and
Iceland, two capitalist societies at opposite ends of the stratification continuum among
Western, industrialized democracies. Her findings show that, despite di↵erent e↵orts
states put into equalizing life chance outcomes, higher levels of educational attainment
translate into better health in both countries. Recent studies conducted among Euro-
pean countries show similar results (Huisman et al., 2005; Mackenbach et al., 2014).
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Less is known, however, whether a di↵erent pattern would emerge in a state socialist
country, in which the state has even great latitude to shape social structures.
3.2.2 Empirical Evidence of the Educational-Health Relationship
Distinguishing the three theoretical perspectives is important but di cult. To tease out
selectivity as a confounder, recent studies of the education-health relationship reflect
the growing popularity of the instrumental variable (IV) method. An instrumental
variable is one that is correlated with the predictor (education) but not with the outcome
(health) other than through its correlation with the predictor (Angrist et al., 1996).
For example, instruments that have been used in education-health research include:
state-level per-capita expenditures on education (Berger and Leigh, 1989; Kenkel et al.,
2006), exemptions from military service (de Walque, 2007), changes in requirements for
high school completion (Kenkel et al., 2006), and college openings (Currie and Moretti,
2003). In particular, one set of studies examines whether individuals who were forced to
continue schooling through various policies were subsequently healthier than those who
were not. In a pioneering study, Lleras-Muney (2005) employed the U.S. compulsory
schooling laws in e↵ect from 1915 to 1939. Drawing on the successive 1960-80 U.S.
censuses, the IV estimate showed that individuals born in states forcing them to remain
in school longer enjoyed significantly higher survival rates in adulthood (3.6 percentage
points higher). Similarly, Arendt (2005); Costas Meghir (2012); Kemptner et al. (2011);
Oreopoulos (2006); Spasojevic (2010) found that increases in minimum schooling laws
in Denmark, England and Ireland, West Germany, and Sweden, improved health for
those who were a↵ected. Contradictory evidence exists as well, such as Albouy and
Lequien (2009) who do not find a causal e↵ect of education on health in France using
this method.
Several studies conducted in China utilize IV methods as well, exploiting closings and
re-openings of high schools and colleges. Consistently, none of them uncover a significant
relationship between education and health, for either urban (Giles et al., 2008; Meng
et al., 2007; Xie and Mo, 2014) or rural China (Zhang, 2014). I replicated these null
findings drawing on my data sets using the interaction term between cohort membership
and family background as an instrument (rationale elaborated below; results shown in
Appendix Table A). Taken together, the causal link from education to health, if exists
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at all, seems to be at least quite weak in China.
How to reconcile these null findings with the significant e↵ects detected in other coun-
tries? More generally, how to assess the validity of the instrumental variables method?
The IV studies, by taking advantage of exogenous shocks, are helpful in addressing
selection due to unobserved heterogeneity. But at times it is unable to distinguish alter-
native theories. Take the three theoretical perspectives discussed above as an example.
Although a significant IV estimate may eliminate selection as a candidate explanation,
it cannot discriminate between the other two. Even worse, a non-significant IV esti-
mate could be due to the existence of “omitted variables,” or the fact that schools may
fail to transmit human capital, or that particular institutional arrangements constrain
the college-educated from profiting from their higher education. This limitation echoes
Deaton (2010a,b) and Heckman (2010), who emphasize that e↵ects occur in time and
in space, and deeper institutional knowledge is needed to advance understanding of the
social world.
To test the human capital thesis, researchers exploit variations in school quality or
look at di↵erential rates of health technology adoption that requires possession and pro-
cessing of knowledge. Frisvold and Golberstein (2011), for example, exploit the substan-
tial improvements in the quality of schools attended by black students in the segregated
southern states during the mid-1900s to show that school quality amplifies the beneficial
e↵ects of education on self-rated health, smoking, obesity, and mortality. From a dif-
ferent angle, in their study of the educational gradient among HIV patients, Goldman
and Smith (2002) show that more educated HIV+ patients are more likely to adhere to
therapy, which in turn improves their self-reported health. A similar pattern is observed
for diabetics, with the ability to maintain a better health regimen—which varies by lev-
els of schooling—an important independent determinant of subsequent health outcomes
(Goldman and Smith, 2002). Taken together, this evidence points to the advantages
more educated persons have in uptake of and acting on new medical information as well
as self-management, possibly developed through the schooling they received.
Lastly, a good test of fundamental cause theory occurs when socioeconomic status
can be analytically separated from the ability to use socioeconomic resources (Phelan
et al., 2010). One such situation is when resources associated with higher status are
useless in preventing death (Deaton, 2011; Phelan et al., 2010), for example, potentially
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fatal diseases that no one knows how to prevent or treat. In this case, individuals are un-
able to “agentically use” resources. Supportive evidence has been found along this line.
Livi-Bacci (1991) showed that from the sixteenth to the eighteenth centuries, English
aristocrats had no life expectancy advantage over the rest of the population, despite their
presumably high SES. Likewise, Preston and Haines (1991) reported that parental edu-
cation had no bearing on children survival in the last decade of the nineteenth century
U.S. These findings suggest that having more education is useless in promoting health
when nothing is known about how to fight particular a✏ictions (Deaton, 2011; Phelan
et al., 2004). Conversely, when diseases, treatments, risks, and knowledge about risks
change, fundamental cause theory predicts corresponding changes in the educational
gradients in health (Miech et al., 2011), as documented, for instance, by Chang and
Lauderdale (2009) showing how income disparities in cholesterol levels have changed
with the emergence of statins. These studies point to the importance of context in
shaping the education-health relationship. Less attention, however, has been paid to
the level of society, to examine how alternative social institutions with di↵erential “who
gets what” rules may alter the taken-for-granted link between education and health.
3.3 The China Case
How does the China case illuminate the relationship between education and health? I
elaborate on three distinct aspects of China that in tandem permit two tests to shed
light on the relative validity of each argument. The hypotheses are summarized in Table
3.1.
[Table 3.1 about here]
3.3.1 Test 1: The Chinese Cultural Revolution (1966-76) as a Struc-
tural Break
First, the Cultural Revolution provides a rare opportunity to examine health implica-
tions when the selection criteria for college admission change and when schooling quality
su↵ers a marked decline. After the Communist takeover in 1949, China’s political prior-
ities have shifted dramatically, directly a↵ecting opportunity structures and allocative
mechanisms of educational attainment (Hannum, 1999; Pepper, 1991; Zhou et al., 1996).
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Before the Cultural Revolution, academically talented students—disproportionately
from intellectual families—were much more likely to test into high-quality schools and
colleges. This situation changed during the Cultural Revolution (1966-76), when the
education system was disrupted in order to achieve Chairman Mao’s vision of a society
with little intergenerational transmission of educational advantage (Pepper, 1991; Shirk,
1979). The disruption was most pronounced and persistent at the college level (Shirk,
1979), with national college entrance examinations ceasing to be held from 1966 to late
1977. Colleges began extremely restricted recruitment from 1972 on, based on family
background rather than academic merit (Meng et al., 2007; Pepper, 1991; Unger, 1982),
favoring those from worker, peasant, and soldier families. Children of the intellectuals,
who before 1966 were among the best students, were the biggest losers of the Cultural
Revolution (Broaded, 1983; Deng and Treiman, 1997; Giles et al., 2008; Unger, 1980).1
Further, the Cultural Revolution was characterized as a decade of declining educa-
tional quality (Broaded, 1991; Jiang and Ashley, 2013). After a brief moment of school
closings, primary and middle school recommenced in 1968 and colleges began extremely
limited admission in 1972, but actual learning was dubious at all levels. In addition to
receiving military training and Mao Thought study classes, students were organized to
criticize their textbooks and other features of the school system, or else go to factories
and the countryside to do manual work (Hannum, 1999; Meng et al., 2007). Midterms
and final exams were given, but students were to repeat grades only if they and their
parents agreed (Pepper, 1991). Not surprisingly, Treiman (2002, 18) showed that “the
cost of the Cultural Revolution, at least at the outset, was to reduce literacy scores by
about one grade level—a strong e↵ect.”
Taken together, if either the selection or the human capital thesis is true, individuals
from the Cultural Revolution cohort would be expected to gain less health advantage
based on their educational levels, as compared to members in the cohorts preceding
or following them. This is so given that the Cultural Revolution changed the types
1 Note that some members of the Cultural Revolution cohort—mostly from intellectual families—
returned to college after the ending of the Cultural Revolution (see Chapter 2). Given that the compo-
sition of and the nature of the higher education received by these returners di↵er from that of those who
went to college during the Cultural Revolution, I did a sensitivity analysis by excluding these returnees
when conducting Test 1, finding results similar to those presented here.
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of children eligible to climb the educational ladder (see Figure 3.1A), and that the
schooling they received during the Cultural Revolution decade failed to transmit into
actual human capital (see Figure 3.1B). Therefore, the first hypothesis is:
Hypothesis 1a: Any health advantage associated with education is weakened for mem-
bers of the Cultural Revolution cohort, compared with members in adjacent cohorts, be-
cause the highly educated from the Cultural Revolution cohort tend to come from less
advantaged families due to the state intervention (selection thesis) or received schooling
of lower quality when they came of age (human capital thesis).
What varies little across these three cohorts, however, constitutes the second distinct
aspect of the China case: the institutional arrangement of China as a single-party state
society. As many social stratification scholars (Bian, 1994; Nee, 1989; Zhou, 2010) have
insightfully pointed out, membership in the Communist Party became a key basis of
social stratification after the Communist seizure of state power (Szelenyi, 1978). Given
that the Communist Party and the state, not the market, play a fundamental role in
allocating resources—health-promoting resources included— educational degrees may
not be su cient to gain access to these resources. Even with the economic reform
(initiated in the mid-1980s in urban China, and intensified in 1992) and the resulting
rising role of education in getting ahead (Zhang et al., 2005), the state and the party
remain a strong force in China (Bian and Logan, 1996; Bian et al., 2001; Hauser and
Xie, 2005). This is especially the case for the three cohorts examined in this paper, who
entered the labor force before the intensification of urban China’s economic reform.
According to fundamental cause theory, given the similar institutional arrangements
these three cohorts have been exposed to, no cohort di↵erence in the education-health
link should be expected:
Hypothesis 1b: Any health advantage associated with education remains similar for
members of the Cultural Revolution cohort compared with members in adjacent cohorts,
because China’s institutional arrangements regarding resource allocation—that the party
and the state play a decisive role—have not changed (fundamental cause thesis).
3.3.2 Test 2: Two-Career Path and Sponsored Mobility
A third distinct aspect of China lies in its two-career path for the college educated. Re-
call that one obstacle in testing fundamental cause theory is to find a situation in which
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socioeconomic status could be analytically separated from the ability to use socioeco-
nomic resources (Phelan et al., 2010). The distinct Chinese two-career path provides
just such a scenario. Specifically, the Chinese regime has created two segmented elite
“markets”: elite professionals and elite administrative positions, reserved for persons
with di↵erent types of credentials. College education has been a persistently vital pre-
requisite for professional positions but party membership has never been a criterion for
such positions; for administrative posts, however, party membership is always a pre-
requisite and a college education has become a criterion after the Cultural Revolution
(Dickson and Rublee, 2000; Walder, 1995; Walder et al., 2000). Given the distinct re-
quirements for each career path, I distinguish two groups of elites among the college
educated: those with both educational and political credentials (the dual elite) and
those with only a college degree (the education-only elite). In terms of access to a flex-
ible range of resources, research shows that the dual elite enjoy a noticeable advantage
over the education-only elite because of their closer connection with the state and the
party (Bian, 2002; Li and Walder, 2001; Walder et al., 2000). Given these di↵erences in
resource access, fundamental cause theory predicts that only members of the dual elite
enjoy a health advantage. This prediction contrasts with expectations related to the
selection thesis or human capital theory, which will predict no di↵erence in health be-
tween the education-only elite and the dual elite, given that both groups have a college
degree.
Furthermore, the ways through which the dual elite (college educated and party
members) obtained both credentials di↵er. Previous stratification research revealed two
distinct processes: political incorporation of the already highly educated (Bian et al.,
2001) and party-sponsored returning-to-school of party members (Li and Walder, 2001).
To quickly develop personnel that were both “Red” (politically loyal) and experts,
a large number of party members were sent back to school to upgrade their human
capital (Li and Walder, 2001, alse see Chapter 2). Over time, however, a political
incorporation model gradually dominates, given the growing educational level of the
general population (Bian et al., 2001). I therefore further separate the dual elite into
the incorporated dual elite and the sponsored dual elite, based on the timing of each
obtaining educational credentials.
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The sponsored dual elite group deserves special attention, given their unique educa-
tional experience. They tend to come from working-class families (given the recruiting
criteria adopted by the party), and the college education they received later in life is
widely considered as lower quality and of dubious merit (Dickson, 2014). Therefore, if
the selection or human capital thesis is true, members of the sponsored dual elite should
have lower levels of health compared with either the education-only elite or the incor-
porated dual elite, who received their higher education on time. By contrast, given the
sponsored elite’s connection with the state/party and its advantages in gaining access to
health-promoting resources, fundamental cause theory predicts that they should enjoy
better health than the education-only elite.
Hypothesis 2a: Members of the sponsored dual elite have lower levels of health, com-
pared with either the education-only elite or the incorporated dual elite, even though all
have a college degree (selection thesis and human capital thesis).
Hypothesis 2b: Members of the education-only elite have lower levels of health, com-
pared with either the sponsored dual elite or the incorporated dual elite (fundamental
cause thesis).
3.4 Data, Measures, and Methods
3.4.1 Data and Sample
I draw on three surveys collected eight years apart over a span of almost 20 years: the
1994 State and Life Chances in Urban China Survey (Life Chances), the 2002 Chinese
Household Income Project (CHIP), and the 2010 China Family Panel Studies (CFPS).
The Life Chances survey used retrospective interview questions to collect life chances
measures among urban residents of China. Through a multistage sampling procedure,
this survey covered 20 cities in 6 provinces representing a variety of geographic locations
and types of urban economies in China (Zhou and Moen, 2002). The 2002 Chinese
Household Income Project (CHIP) aims to measure and estimate the distribution of
personal income and related economic factors in China. Data were collected through a
series of questionnaire-based interviews conducted in urban and rural areas at the end
of 2002. The CHIP sampling methods were designed to represent the four regions of
China—coastal, central, western, and a separate category for large municipalities with
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provincial status (Beijing, Tianjin, and Shanghai). Provinces were then selected from
each region to reflect its economic characteristics. The urban data set contains 20,632
individual household members residing in 6,835 households (Li et al., 2008). The 2010
China Family Panel Studies (CFPS) adopted multistage, implicit stratification, and
probability-proportion-to-size sampling methods to obtain a nationally representative
sample (Xie et al., 2012). The sample included 14,960 households; interviews were
conducted with all family members aged 10 or older. I choose these three surveys
because all of them collected health-related measures, which is rare in Chinese surveys
especially before the mid-2000s. All three have reasonable regional coverage, with two
of them nationally representative. Further, these three surveys in combination span
almost 20 years, permitting analysis of whether new patterns emerge as these cohorts
move into later life stages and as the Chinese economic transition intensifies.
I construct my analytic sample based on the following criteria. First, samples are
restricted to those born between 1930 and 1972 to capture the three cohorts (described
below). Second, respondents are restricted to those holding an urban hukou (registra-
tion of household residence), given China’s distinct educational opportunity structures
between urban and rural areas. Respondents from all three surveys lived in urban ar-
eas during the survey, but some may have migrated from rural areas. Based on data
availability, I remove respondents who did not have an urban hukou by age 15 for the
2002 CHIP survey and by age 12 for the 2010 CFPS survey. For the 1994 Life Chances
survey, I exclude respondents who received their primary school education in rural ar-
eas. Third, for the Life Chances survey, I drop two provinces (Jiangsu and Guangdong)
because information on party membership was deleted in these provinces upon local
government request (Zhou and Moen, 2002).
3.4.2 Measures
Outcome
I examine self-reported health, which has been validated as a reliable predictor of subse-
quent survival (Idler and Angel, 1990; Idler and Benyamini, 1997) and has been widely
used in previous health research conducted in China (e.g., Chen et al., 2010; Hu, 2013).
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As a global measure, self-reported health is consistent with the definition of health pro-
vided by the World Health Organization (1946), that “Health is a state of complete
physical, mental and social well-being and not merely the absence of disease or infir-
mity.” This health measure is included in all three surveys. The 1994 Life Chances
survey asked respondents to rate their health status on a scale from 1 to 10. In the 2002
CHIP and the 2010 CFPS surveys, the scales ran from 1 to 5.
Key Explanatory Variables
Cohort Membership. Cohort is created based on the calendar year when respondents
turned 19, the typical age for entering college in China. The Cultural Revolution cohort
consists of those who came of age during the Cultural Revolution (born 1947-57, aged 9-
19 in 1966). This cohort’s opportunities to receive a normal college education were lost
or at least disrupted, due to the cessation of regular college admission throughout that
decade and the rustication policy that sent many high-school children to rural areas
(Zhou and Hou, 1999). The Pre-Cultural Revolution (pre-CR) cohort refers to those
who turned 19 between the establishment of People’s Republic of China in 1949 and the
beginning of the Cultural Revolution in 1966 (born 1930-46, aged 20-36 in 1966). The
Post-Cultural Revolution (post-CR) cohort is defined as those who turned 19 after the
Cultural Revolution and before the intensification of urban China’s economic reforms
in 1992 (born 1958-72, younger than 9 in 1966). Table 3.2 summarizes the operational
definitions of these three cohorts, as well as their ages in some important years.
[Table 3.2 about here]
Elite Groups based on Educational and Political Credentials. This measure takes
two forms. First, I create a four-category measure taking into account the political
credential (measured by party membership) of the highly educated: (1) less than high
school; (2) high school; (3) the education-only elite (at minimum associate college but
not party members); and (4) the dual elite (at minimum associate college and party
members). Second, I divide the fourth group into two subgroups based on their obtaining
educational and political credentials in di↵erent orders to create a five-category measure:
(4) the incorporated dual elite, college completed before joining the party; and (5) the
sponsored dual elite, beginning college after joining the party.2
2 The timing variables were collected in the 1994 Life Chances survey and the 2010 CFPS. For the
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Mediators
As an explorative analysis, I investigate whether health disparities among di↵erent
groups may be mediated by the following variables detected to be important in prior
literature. Note that not all variables were collected in all three surveys.
1. Material resources:
(a) Personal income, wealth measured by house ownership, and health care eli-
gibility.
(b) Occupation: professionals and cadres, the two elite occupations in China, are
compared against ordinary workers. The dichotomous cadre variable equals 1
if the respondent reported to hold the position of bureaucratic administrator
at the rank of department level, ke ji, or above.
(c) Subjective SES is the response individuals gave when asked to evaluate their
socioeconomic status on a 1 (“very low”) to 5 (“very high”) scale.
2. Social support:
(a) Marital status: I contrast respondents who were married and those who were
not.
(b) Spouse characteristics: This set of variables includes spouses’ educational
attainment, income, or occupation (cadre, professional, ordinary workers).
(c) Social support scale, the mean response to five questions assessing emotional
(e.g., “Who do you talk to for support and understanding when things get
rough?”) and instrumental support (e.g. “Who would take care of you if you
were sick?”).
3. Health behaviors:
(a) Smoking : whether respondents never smoked (reference), quitted smoking,
currently smoke at most 10 cigarettes per day, or currently smoke more than
10 cigarettes per day.
2002 CHIP, I distinguish the incorporated dual elite and the sponsored dual elite based on the question
“Have you tested into college?” This is reasonable because to attend college on time requires one to
pass the national entrance examination except the very few (less than .5%) who were exempted from
standardized exams because of exceptional or special talent.
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(b) Drinking : whether respondents never drank excessively (reference), quitted
drinking excessively, or currently drink excessively.
(c) Exercise: a dichotomous variable contrasting those who exercise versus those
who do not.
Covariates
I control for gender (women = 1), age, age squared, and province of residence. Social
origins were assessed by either family background or parental education, depending on
measure availability. Family background is a label assigned by the state and served as
a critical basis for political discrimination during the Maoist era (1949-76). Before its
abolition in 1979, individuals were routinely required to report this label on applications
for educational enrollment, jobs, and promotions. Following Zhou (2010), I collapse
these labels into four categories in the 1994 Life Chances Survey: (1) Cadre, (2) Working
Class, (3) Intellectual, and (4) Exploiting Class. These categories were also collected
in the 2010 CFPS survey, but because very few respondents reported the backgrounds
of cadre or exploiting class, I only distinguish working class and intellectuals. Parental
education (high school or above = 1) is used to capture social origins in the 2002 CHIP
survey. Finally, I adjust for the rustication experiences (Zhou and Hou, 1999), with
those once sent to rural areas coded as 1.
3.4.3 Methods
I draw on ordinal logit models to test my hypotheses. To examine whether the rela-
tionship between education and health di↵ers for members from di↵erent cohorts (Test
1), I investigate whether the interaction terms between education and cohort are sta-
tistically significant when predicting self-reported health. For Test 2, post-estimation
t-test is used to determine whether the education-only elite and the dual elite have
significantly di↵erent levels of health. I then divide the dual elite into the incorporated
elite and the sponsored elite, to see whether these two groups, as well as when compared
against the education-only elite, are significantly di↵erent from each other. Lastly, to
determine possible mechanisms underlying the observed health di↵erences, I add the-
orized mediators. Analyses for the 2002 CHIP survey and the 2010 CFPS survey are
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weighted to represent the urban Chinese population.
3.5 Results
3.5.1 Descriptive Statistics
Table 3.3 provides summary statistics for the three survey samples by educational and
political credentials: high school or less, the education-only elite, the incorporated dual
elite, and the sponsored dual elite. My discussion focuses on comparisons between the
three elite groups. Statistically significant age and cohort di↵erences are observed for
the three elite groups. In general, members of the education-only elite are the youngest,
especially when compared with the sponsored dual-elite (p < .01 for each of the three
survey samples). Correspondingly, members of the education-only elite are overrepre-
sented in the post-CR cohort, while those of the sponsored dual-elite are overrepresented
in the CR cohort. Women’s disadvantage in becoming an elite member is observed in
all three cohorts and all three surveys, but their gap with men is particularly noticeable
for the dual elite, reflecting men’s higher odds of joining the party. Family background
also di↵ers greatly across these three elite groups. Individuals from intellectual families
(or whose parents had a high school degree) are more likely to belong to the education-
only elite or the incorporated dual elite as opposed to the sponsored dual elite, whereas
those born into working-class families are more likely to be members of the dual elite,
especially the sponsored dual elite.
[Table 3.3 about here]
Turning to socioeconomic achievements, members of the education-only elite earned
more than those of the dual elite in 1994; the incorporated dual-elite caught up with
the highest earnings in both 2002 and 2010. There is not much di↵erence in house
ownership. Consistent with previous studies, a clear two-career path is evident for these
three groups. Members of the education-only elite are the most likely to be professionals
and the least likely to be cadres; by contrast, members of the dual elite—especially
the sponsored dual elite—are the most likely to be cadres and the least likely to be
professionals. Further, compared with the dual elite, members of the education-only
elite have significantly lower levels of health care coverage (⇡70% vs. ⇡80%). These
three groups also locate themselves di↵erently when asked to assess their socioeconomic
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status, with the sponsored dual elite placing themselves highest (3.22 on a 1-5 scale),
followed by the incorporated dual elite (2.9) and the education-only elite (2.8).
3.5.2 Cohort Di↵erences in the Relationship between Educational At-
tainment and Health (Test 1)
Given the dramatically di↵erent early-life experiences of the three cohorts, a cohort
di↵erence in the education-health link is expected if either the selection or the hu-
man capital theses was true. Specifically, from these perspectives, the highly educated
from the Cultural Revolution cohort should have significantly lower health later in life,
compared with their counterparts in other cohorts. However, no such di↵erences are
observed (Table 3.4). The signs of the interaction terms between associate college and
cohort membership are not consistent across years, and none of them are statistically
significant. Moreover, the only significant interaction term is a positive one between high
school and the Cultural Revolution cohort, opposite to what is expected based on the
selection or the human capital thesis. Therefore, Hypothesis 1b is supported, suggesting
that the key for health is institutional arrangements that set parameters determining
who gets what, which remains largely stable for these three Chinese cohorts.
[Table 3.4 about here]
3.5.3 Di↵erences in Health across Elite Groups (Test 2)
Table 3.5 reports estimates from ordinal logit models regressing self-reported health on
elite group membership. Models 1, 3 and 5 use a four-category measure distinguishing
the education-only elite from the dual elite, while Models 2, 4, and 6 further separate
the sponsored dual elite from the incorporated dual elite. Across all surveys, members
of the dual elite enjoy significantly better health than those who do not go to high school
(.308, p < .01; .446, p < .001; .368, p < .05, respectively). By contrast, compared with
those who do not have a high school degree, members of the education-only elite have
marginally better health only in year 2002. Further, post-estimation tests indicate that
di↵erences in health between the education-only elite and the dual elite are statistically
distinguishable from 0 in 2002 (p < .05) and 2010 (p < .05). Taken as a whole, these
results provide supportive evidence for Hypothesis 2b (derived from fundamental cause
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theory) rather than Hypothesis 2a (based on selection or human capital thesis).
[Table 3.5 about here]
Next, I distinguish the dual elite based on the temporal order when they obtained
each credential (Models 2, 4, and 6). Both groups—the incorporated dual elite and
the sponsored dual elite—have significantly better self-reported health compared with
those who do not go to high school. For the incorporated dual elite, the estimated
coe cients are .299 (p < .05) in 1994, .462 (p < .05) in 2002, and .491 (p < .05) in
2010. For the sponsored dual elite, the corresponding estimates are .323 (p < .1) in
1994, .438 (p < .01) in 2002, and .173 (p < .05) in 2010. Further, members from either
dual-elite group have significantly higher levels of health as compared with those from
the education-only elite (p < .05, except in year 1994). The di↵erences between the
two dual-elite groups, by contrast, do not reach statistical significance in any of the
three surveys. Taken together, these findings suggest that the di↵erence in health exists
primarily between the education-only elite and the dual elite, as opposed to within the
dual elite group, further supporting Hypothesis 2b.
3.5.4 Mechanisms between Educational Attainment and Health
Lastly, I examine several mechanisms that presumably explain the relationship between
education and health. The first set of mediators includes material resources such as
income, wealth (home ownership), and medical care. Next, the unique two-career paths
for the college educated are considered by adjusting for occupation (professionals and
cadres). Social relationships such as marital status, spouses’ characteristics and social
support, as well as health behaviors, are also potential mechanisms linking education
and health. Table 3.6 shows that, among all mediators, adding occupational tracks
attenuates the health gap between the dual elite and the education-only elite the most
(for the 1994 and 2002 surveys). In particular, being a cadre has tremendous health
benefits. The 2010 CFPS survey did not collect occupation, so I add subjective evalu-
ation of socioeconomic status. Again, this variable alone closes the health gap between
the dual elite and the education-only elite.
[Table 3.6 about here]
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3.6 Discussion
The powerful role of education in determining health-related outcomes in the United
States and other Western countries has motivated some scholars to refer to education
as a “fundamental cause” (Link and Phelan, 1995) or “root cause” (Mirowsky and
Ross, 2003, 31) of health. Yet, what is less understood is what aspect of education
matters. Human capital theorists emphasize knowledge and skills obtained through
learning, fundamental cause theory highlights social institutions that almost universally
link educational advantage with advantages in other aspects, while scholars who see ed-
ucation as a spurious correlate argue that it is unobserved heterogeneity such as family
background and ability that confounds the relationship between education and health.
Distinguishing these perspectives has important theoretical and practical implications.
In this paper, I test these three theoretical perspectives drawing on survey data collected
in an institutional context di↵erent from that of the West, which presents a unique re-
search site to analytically separate the components emphasized in di↵erent perspectives.
My findings provide strong support for and extend fundamental cause theory. I discuss
below the theoretical, methodological and practical implications of this study.
Theoretically, my findings cast doubt on education’s universal role in structuring
health disparities. One contribution of this paper, therefore, is to show that particular
institutional arrangements figure dominantly in determining educational gradient in
health. In industrialized market societies, the market plays a central role in allocating
resources; education, as a signal of human capital and productivity, is consequently
rewarded and associated with a wide range of flexible and desirable resources beneficial
for health. This is the case for both “liberal” countries such as the United States (Adler
et al., 1994; Elo and Preston, 1996; Kitagawa and Hauser, 1973; Meara et al., 2008) and
countries where the welfare state plays an active role in resource redistribution such as
the Nordic nations (Olafsdottir, 2007).
However, the importance of education for getting ahead is not necessarily a natural
or fixed feature of society. In China’s particular macropolitical environment, it is the
state and the Communist Party—rather than the market—that distribute and allocate
resources (Bian, 2002; Nee, 1989, 1996; Walder et al., 2000; Zhou, 2010; Zhou et al.,
1996). State/party policies can even change the very meaning of “resources,” the most
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extreme case being the Cultural Revolution decade when parents’ education was con-
sidered as a liability rather than an asset (Deng and Treiman, 1997; Unger, 1982; Zhou
and Hou, 1999; Zhou et al., 1996). Even with the ending of the Cultural Revolution and
the burgeoning economic reform in urban China, education has yet to become a funda-
mental force in shaping life chances as it is in Western societies (Walder, 1996; Zhao and
Zhou, 2002; Zhou, 2000). By contrast, party a liation, as an indicator of one’s loyalty
to and connection with the state/party apparatus, turns out to play a more important
role in structuring health disparities. Irrespective of the order in which educational and
political credentials are obtained, members of the incorporated and the sponsored dual
elite enjoy significantly better health than those in the education-only elite, even though
all three groups have a college degree. This also explains why no cohort di↵erence is
observed for the education-health relationship,3 even though members of the Cultural
Revolution cohort su↵ered declining schooling quality (key to human capital theory)
and for this cohort, only those from the working class were eligible to attend college
(key to the spurious correlation thesis). What largely remains the same for the three
cohorts, however, is the single-party state society of China. Even with the economic
transition China has experienced and the growth of the market, party members use
various overt and covert ways to maintain their power, as pointed out by the “power
conversion” (Rona-Tas, 1994) and “power persistence” (Bian and Logan, 1996) theses in
the social stratification literature. Therefore, the meaning of education and its health
implication could well exhibit di↵erent patterns in societies with alternative institu-
tional arrangements. Accordingly, there is no way to map education and life chances
without locating individuals in a socially and historically bounded life course context;
recognizing that variations by social contexts and historical timing are key to unravel
social determinants of health. Echoing a very recent study (Hayward et al., 2015), it is
perhaps more fruitful to ask under what conditions (time, place, institutions) education
is associated with health, rather than whether or not education has a causal e↵ect on
health.
Another theoretical contribution of this paper is to show the value of distinguishing
3 One previous study showed a significant cohort by education interaction. Using growth curve
models, Chen et al. (2010) reported significant cohort variations in educational disparities in self-reported
health. But the size of the education by cohort (coded 1 to 6) interaction is small, -0.01 for an outcome
ranging from 1-4 (Table 2, 136).
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alternative types of resources key to the fundamental cause theory: knowledge/skills
(concrete knowledge, as well as cognitive and non-cognitive skills), money, power, pres-
tige, and desirable social connections. Previous tests of fundamental cause theory con-
centrate on human resources, for example, how high SES individuals act upon new med-
ical knowledge (e.g., smoking is harmful), thereby gaining health advantage over low
SES individuals (Chang and Lauderdale, 2009; Glied and Lleras-Muney, 2008; Goldman
and Smith, 2005; Link et al., 1998; Rubin et al., 2014; de Walque, 2004). This focus
makes it di cult to di↵erentiate fundamental cause theory and human capital theory.
Further, it has the tendency to “blame the victim” and leads to interventions focus-
ing on disseminating new medical knowledge rather than reforms beyond the medical
arena. Future studies need to direct more attention to the roles of resources other than
knowledge/skills in the shaping of health disparities.
Concentrating on knowledge and skills is even more problematic in the case of China.
As shown, health behaviors—the type of resources most relevant to knowledge/skill—do
not seem to explain much the health gap between the education-only elite and the dual
elite. In fact, it is surprising to see that it is the sponsored dual elite, who supposedly
have accumulated less knowledge and skills, who are most likely to exercise and least
likely to smoke, suggesting other factors are operating to shape health behaviors. In
comparison to health behaviors, occupational track is a more important factor; becoming
a cadre brings about great health benefits. The question then becomes: what it is about
the cadre occupation that yields health advantages? One possibility could be income.
Although I control for income, to what extent this measure truthfully captures the real
incomes obtained by cadres is questionable; rent-seeking and grey income acquired by
exploiting their strategic positions in the state hierarchy is not an uncommon practice
for cadres. Subjective SES is also worth examining. That the education-only elite and
the incorporated dual elite evaluate themselves as located lower than the sponsored
dual elite in the social hierarchy point to the limitation of merely relying on objective
SES measures to study health, especially in societies with distinct social stratification
systems.
From a methodological perspective, this paper adds to the lively debate between the
“structural” and “reductionist” schools of causal inference. There is interest in using
instrumental variables (IV) to identify the “causal e↵ect” of education on health (e.g.,
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Lleras-Muney, 2005). But scholars have voiced cautions against a simple reductionist
approach. Among other critiques, Deaton (2010a) highlights that context and mecha-
nism are missing in the reductionist approach (also see Pawson and Tilley, 1997), leading
to little learning regarding potentially generalizable mechanisms. This study illustrates
the limitation of the IV method through a comparison between IV results and results
based on theoretical-driven contextual analyses. As described, previous studies using
the Chinese Cultural Revolution as an instrument show that education has no “causal
e↵ect” on health. This statement, however, does not point to the source of this null
e↵ect.
Indeed, “null e↵ects” are subject to multiple interpretations, but previous studies
focus exclusively on the spurious correlations explanation. Because the IV method relies
on “exclusion restriction” to eliminate influences of confounders (“third variables”),
the reasoning goes, a null IV estimate means that the significant association between
education and health as found in conventional models (e.g., OLS) is driven by those
third variables. In other words, spurious correlations explain why educational gradients
in health are so persistently observed. However, this interpretation ignores the social
contexts that assign meanings to education. While IV methods pay due attention to the
process determining educational attainment, it overlooks what follows once one obtains
a diploma, or the “life circumstances” (Link et al., 2013) a higher education degree
brings about, which is highly dependent on the specific institutional configurations of
a society and requires a case-by-case study. In the presence of institutional variations,
therefore, estimated policy e↵ects from one setting are less likely to be externally valid
in others.
The Cultural Revolution represents an extreme case in human history. This natu-
rally leads to the question of generalizability as well as the practical value of the current
study. Although focusing on three Chinese cohorts, this paper is motivated by the broad
sociological question of why education matters for health, as well as how particular in-
stitutional arrangement and dramatic social upheavals produce variations in individual
life chances. The Cultural Revolution, rare as it was, provides a unique natural exper-
iment where some key social parameters were reversed sharply (e.g., intergenerational
transmission of education). Further, the Chinese institutional configuration o↵ers a rare
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situation in which “the ability to use socioeconomic resources can be analytically sepa-
rated from SES itself” (Phelan et al., 2010). The arguments and findings, accordingly,
have implications for many other societies—such as the post-Communist countries—
where macropolitical environment matters strongly for individual life chances; more
generally, this research sheds light on the role of education in structuring health.
From a policy perspective, assessing the validity of three theoretical perspectives
suggests in turn di↵erent types of possible interventions. Knowledge or skills as high-
lighted in human capital theory, for example, is usually learned in the educational
system and thus calls for high quality education. Socially rewarding and redistributive
institutions play key roles in the connection between education and health-beneficial
resources, as emphasized by fundamental cause theory. The spurious correlation thesis,
in comparison, argues for a still di↵erent set of policies, for example, early-life interven-
tions developed to promote specific characteristics (i.e., the “third variables”). Given
my findings, a more appropriate way to fight health disparities by SES seems to be to
target social reward and redistribution mechanisms in order to weaken the link between
advantaged social status and other resources. This is without doubt a di cult social
endeavor. And, as pointed out by Freese and Lutfey (2011), it may have unintended
consequences. Care should be exercised to weigh benefits and costs.
This study has several limitations. First, although I draw on three surveys collected
in di↵erent historical periods, all of them are cross-sectional. Future studies with longi-
tudinal data are necessary to examine questions about health trajectories. Second, more
detailed measures of potential mediators are needed to better understand why members
of the education-only elite lag behind those of the dual elite in health, and to understand
what this means for policy interventions. Third, self-reported health is a widely used
and well-recognized health measure that is highly predictive of subsequent mortality,
but more objective health measures such as morbidity or mortality are better positioned
to address any bias related to self reports. Fourth, this study examines three Chinese
cohorts who entered the labor market before the intensification of the economic reform
in urban China (1992). What is it like for more recent cohorts whose career coincides
with China’s transition from a redistributive to a market economy? Market transition
theory predicts that returns to human capital will increase in such a transition (Nee,
1989), but power persistence and power conversion theses argue the opposite (Bian and
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Logan, 1996). To what extent the patterns detected in this research are generalizable
to even more recent Chinese cohorts is an empirical question.
To conclude, this study casts doubt on the universal beneficial e↵ect of educational
attainment on health. It supports but also complicates fundamental cause theory, re-
vealing that institutional arrangements that shape access to resources are important
parameters for understanding the powerful link between education and health. Only
through discoveries of how education is linked to di↵erent health outcomes in societies
with di↵erent institutional arrangements and at di↵erent historical times can our un-
derstanding of the society advances.
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Chapter 4
Turning Point or Selection?
Rustication and Midlife Health of
Chinese Cultural Revolution
Cohort
Abstract
The rustication policy implemented during the Chinese Cultural Revolution (CR) (1966-
76) sent more than 17 million urban youth—a third of the Cultural Revolution cohort
(i.e., those turning age 19 during Cultural Revolution)—to rural areas. The life chances
of these rusticated youth subsequent to their returning to cities have been the focus of
much research, but no study has examined the long-term consequences of rustication
for midlife health. Further, existing literature typically treats the Cultural Revolution
cohort as a uniform whole, even though those in its leading and trailing edges were
subject to di↵erent types of selection criteria given shifting rustication policies. Based
on life history data collected from the 1994 State and Life Chances in Urban China
Survey, I show that duration spent in rural areas and cohort membership combine
to shape midlife health, with health disadvantage mostly borne by members of the
trailing-edge CR cohort who lived in rural areas for more than 5 years. Two potential
explanations for this finding are selection and turning-point. Results from propensity
70
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score matching support the selection explanation; because the rustication policy became
less strictly implemented in the later stages of Cultural Revolution, those who were sent
to rural areas and stayed there for a long time from trailing-edge CR cohort were
disadvantaged in many other ways, accounting for their poorer health later in life.
In addition, the absence of running water in rural areas when these late returners
were rusticated exacerbated their disadvantages. By contrast, measures of life chances
following rusticated youth’s home returning—their marital status, occupation, income,
and work unit—di↵er little from those who stayed in cities, thereby refuting the turning-
point view.
4.1 Introduction
Recent decades have witnessed a growing interest in adopting a life-course perspective
to study health-related outcomes (Ben-Shlomo and Kuh, 2002; Blackwell et al., 2001;
Elo and Preston, 1992; Hayward and Gorman, 2004; Preston et al., 1998). A number
of early-life conditions—exposure to adverse conditions in utero, nutritional deficits,
poverty, and stressful family conditions—have been shown to have far-reaching asso-
ciations with subsequent health (Barker, 1998; Ben-Shlomo and Kuh, 2002; Blackwell
et al., 2001; Elo and Preston, 1992; Fan and Qian, 2015).
Guided by this literature, this paper examines the relationship between the early-life
experience of being sent by the state to rural areas and subsequent midlife health among
members of the Chinese Cultural Revolution cohort, defined as those who turned age 19
during the Cultural Revolution (1966-76). Initiated by Mao, the Cultural Revolution
was a decade-long political campaign lasting from 1966 to 1976 with a radical agenda to
implement Mao’s vision of socialism (Tsou, 1999). In addition to disrupted educational
opportunities due to the prolonged attack on the education system during that turbu-
lent decade (Davis, 1992; Davis-Friedmann, 1985; Deng and Treiman, 1997; Meng and
Gregory, 2002; Pepper, 1991; Unger, 1982), many members of the Cultural Revolution
cohort were severely a↵ected by the rustication policy, otherwise known as the “up to
the mountains and down to the villages” or the send-down movement that sent children
in their late teens and early twenties to the countryside (Bernstein, 1977; Bonnin and
Horko, 2013; Esherick et al., 2006; Zhou and Hou, 1999).
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The rustication policy, formally implemented in 1968, required all eligible “young
intellectuals,” by and large graduating classes from middle and high schools who barely
reached the age of 18, to leave the cities and move into the countryside to be “reedu-
cated” by the peasants (Bernstein, 1977; Bonnin and Horko, 2013; Esherick et al., 2006;
Zhou and Hou, 1999). The practice continued for more than ten years until it was
abolished in 1980, leading to an estimated 17 million—about a third of—urban youth
sent to work as peasants in the countryside over the entire Cultural Revolution decade
(Esherick et al., 2006; Zhou and Hou, 1999). Most of these young people—known as
the “intellectual youth” or the “rusticates”—returned home eventually,1 but many
did so only after a period of up to 10 years, creating three distinct groups: stayers
(i.e., those who did not go to the countryside), early returners (i.e., those sent down
who returned home within 5 years), and late returners (i.e., those sent to rural areas
who returned home at least 5 years later); five years is a cutting point typically used in
previous literature (e.g., Lin, 2013; Qian and Hodson, 2011; Xie et al., 2008; Zhou and
Hou, 1999). As Xie et al. (2008, 688) argued, an early return was extremely valuable,
“social inequality in the execution of the send-down policy may have lain more in the
duration of time spent in the countryside than in the probability of being sent down.”
Given the magnitude, intensity, and rareness of the rustication movement, subse-
quent life chances of those rusticated youth have been the focus of several scholarly
investigations (Chen, 1999; Hung and Chiu, 2003; Qian and Hodson, 2011; Xie et al.,
2008; Zang, 2000; Zhou and Hou, 1999). I seek to add to this body of research in two
ways. First, scholarship to date has examined outcomes including education (Qian and
Hodson, 2011; Xie et al., 2008; Zhou and Hou, 1999), employment (Chen, 1999; Hung
and Chiu, 2003; Qian and Hodson, 2011; Xie et al., 2008; Zhou and Hou, 1999), earn-
ings (Qian and Hodson, 2011; Xie et al., 2008; Zhou and Hou, 1999), marriage (Qian
and Hodson, 2011; Zhou and Hou, 1999), political behavior (Zang, 2000), and happi-
ness (Qian and Hodson, 2011). But no study has investigated the extent to which the
rustication experience is linked to health, an important wellbeing component. Second,
1 Not every one returned to cities, however. Even after the o cial revocation of the rustication
policy in 1980, an estimated 0.8 million Rusticates—approximately 4 percent of those who were pulled
to rural areas—were still in the countryside (Bonnin and Horko, 2013). Most of them were not eligible
to return because they got married to local peasants (Bonnin and Horko, 2013; Deng, 2005; Zhou and
Hou, 1999). Given data availability, my analysis focuses on those who survived the harsh conditions in
the rural areas and successfully returned to cities.
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existing literature has not attended to the vast heterogeneity within the Cultural Revo-
lution cohort. For example, the oldest of this cohort had graduated from high school at
the outset of the Cultural Revolution, while the youngest were just beginning primary
school. As I will show, the degree to which their subsequent life chances and especially
health were disrupted by the rustication experience depends greatly on their ages when
the Cultural Revolution was initiated and played out.
This paper asks whether and how the large-scale social dislocation of rustication left
a lasting imprint on midlife health of those who were sent to rural areas during their
formative years. There are multiple possibilities. First, being sent down to rural areas
was not random (Bonnin and Horko, 2013; Qian and Hodson, 2011; Xie et al., 2008;
Zhou and Hou, 1999). As elaborated below, the process is deeply patterned and the
composition of the rusticates changed over the course of the Cultural Revolution, due
to shifting state policies. The pre-rustication characteristics, a↵ecting the likelihood of
being sent down, could also shape their later health. Second, “‘the journeys’ taken by
these young people . . . would make a significant di↵erence in their lives” (Elder, 2003,
65). Except for a few qualitative studies, however, regions of destination and what actu-
ally happened during the journey of rustication have not been examined systematically.
One contribution of this paper, therefore, is to investigate whether di↵erent living con-
ditions in rural areas mattered for later health. Third, the rustication experience might
permeate into midlife health through its influences on other life chance outcomes when
the youth returned to their home cities. The days spent in rural areas likely postponed
and hurt their entire social lives later on (Chen, 1999; Hung and Chiu, 2003; Qian and
Hodson, 2011; Zhou and Hou, 1999), but it could also force youth to become more adap-
tive in order to acquire the skills necessary to their survival (Chen and Cheng, 1999).
Taken as a whole, by linking health with individual characteristics prior to being sent
down, their experiences in rural areas, and their life chances following the return home,
this paper evaluates these alternative explanations and highlights the role of nonrandom
selection in studies of early-life conditions and subsequent health.
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4.2 Turning Point or Selection? A Cohort and Life Course
Framing
I draw on two strands of literature to theorize the experience of rustication. First,
adolescent and early adulthood years spent in rural areas can be viewed as a “turning
point,” an event or a transition that potentially leads to substantial change in the
direction of one’s life (Elder et al., 2003). A turning point can have direct or indirect
implications for subsequent life chances. Exposure to a nutritionally-scarce environment
in utero, for example, has a directly scarring e↵ect for later health (Barker, 1998); a
turning point could also extend its long arm through triggering a series of life events
such as a rough early life leading to other disadvantages (Hayward and Gorman, 2004;
O’Rand and Hamil-Luker, 2005).
Second, any subsequent di↵erences in health between the rusticated and non-rusticated
youth may reflect a process of selection. There is emerging research revealing a dynamic
selection process underneath the observed relationship between early life adversity and
later health (Haas, 2006; Luo and Waite, 2005). In most situations, those “third vari-
ables” work to strengthen such a link. For example, children born into poor families are
more likely to su↵er hunger and less likely to have better health in adult life, thereby
confounding the relationship between childhood hunger and adult health. Occasionally,
however, selection works the other way, such as what happened during the early stage
of the Cultural Revolution when children from more advantaged families bore the brunt
of rustication.
These two points of view have profound implications for this research. The great
majority of existing literature on rustication treats it as a turning point that has fun-
damentally changed the course of the rusticates’ lives, for better or for worse. Hung
and Chiu (2003, 230), for example, commented that “The Cultural Revolution’s impact
on individuals’ subsequent life chances has to be understood in terms of its chain ef-
fects.” Qian and Hodson (2011, 209) observed “The consequences of structural shocks
[rustication] . . . are realized through their impact on a series of life transitions and the
vulnerabilities they amplify or the strivings they engender.” From a positive angle, Chen
and Cheng (1999, 39) argued that “the sent-down youth may be more adaptive, as their
unusual experiences probably improved their social skills and increased their political
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flexibility.” By contrast, although it is well-known that decisions around who was sent
to rural areas were not random (Bonnin and Horko, 2013; Qian and Hodson, 2011; Xie
et al., 2008; Zhou and Hou, 1999), rarely has selection been given due attention when
examining subsequent life chances of rusticated youth (for an exception, see Xie et al.,
2008, as discussed below). One aim of this paper, therefore, is to distinguish the relative
merit of turning point and selection theories in the relationship between rustication and
midlife health.
The respective implications of turning point and selection approaches, I further
argue, should be moderated by cohort membership. Indeed, one limitation of prior
studies on rustication is that they typically treat the Cultural Revolution cohort as a
whole. And yet those in its leading and trailing edges were subject to di↵erent types of
selection criteria given shifting rustication policies. They also encountered di↵erential
structural opportunities in the form of educational and occupational options when they
returned cities. Members of the leading-edge CR cohort were born around 1947-52 and
ages 14-19 at the outset of the Cultural Revolution. Had the Cultural Revolution not
occurred, this cohort would have graduated from middle or high school in the first three
years of the Cultural Revolution, 1966-68, the most chaotic stage when all levels of
schooling were closed. When rustication policy was finalized, this cohort was the first
and most heavily a↵ected group. Members of the trailing-edge CR cohort were born
around 1953-57 and ages 9-13 at the outset of the Cultural Revolution. They were in
primary school when the Cultural Revolution began. Compared with their counterparts
in the leading edge of the CR cohort, members of the trailing edge were exposed to a
less strictly implemented rustication policy, usually sent to locations nearer their place
of origin and not remaining for more than five years (Hung and Chiu, 2003). Below I
examine selection and turning-point explanations through a cohort lens, elaborating on
how the dislocations of rustication may have di↵erent health implications for members
of the leading and trailing edges of the CR cohort because of what occurred before,
during, and after a rustication experience.
4.2.1 Selection: Shifting Rustication Policy
The practice of sending people to rural areas existed even prior to the Cultural Revo-
lution as a way to resolve employment problems in the cities (Bernstein, 1977). But it
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was maintained at a very low scale; not until the Cultural Revolution was rustication
formalized as a policy.2 This policy, which governed who was sent to and who was
able to return from rural areas, changed greatly during the Cultural Revolution decade.
Some scholars show that neither the formal nor informal power of parents was able to
protect children from being sent to rural areas (Deng and Treiman, 1997; Qian and
Hodson, 2011), but this only applies to the early period (Hung and Chiu, 2003; Zhou
and Hou, 1999). From 1967 to 1971, when implementation of the rustication policy
was stringent, children from cadre or intellectual families were at least as likely to be
sent to the countryside as working-class children (Zhou and Hou, 1999). But selective
mechanisms emerged later as the political tides subsided. From 1972 to 1978, high-rank
cadres were in a much better position to either prevent their children from being sent
(for example, by enlisting them in the army or locating them a job in urban areas, see
Bonnin and Horko, 2013, 89) or bring their children back to the cities earlier (Zhou and
Hou, 1999). Therefore, although selection based on family background is negligible for
members of the leading-edge CR cohort, for members of the trailing-edge CR cohort,
children from cadre families are more likely to avoid being sent to rural areas or to
return to cities early.
Hypothesis 1: The composition of rusticates in terms of family background di↵ers
by cohort. Whereas family background does not predict rustication status for members
of the leading edge of the CR cohort, for members of trailing edge, children from cadre
families have lower odds of being sent.
Based on the selection view, the sent-down experience should not be predictive of
midlife health for members of leading-edge CR cohort, given that rustication is almost
compulsory regardless of family background for this cohort. By contrast, among mem-
bers of trailing-edge CR cohort, those who were sent to rural areas—especially those
who lived there for more than five years (i.e., late returners)—are expected to have
poorer health than those who managed to stay in cities. Further, once selection based
on family background is controlled for, rustication should have no bearing on midlife
2 Multiple factors contributed to the rustication policy. The prospect of assigning jobs for each
individual became increasingly bleak in urban areas; the cessation of regular college admission through-
out the Cultural Revolution decade amassed a great number of children who finished high school and
yet had nowhere to go. Moreover, believing that academic institutions were instilling bourgeois ideas,
Mao proposed “the intellectual youth must go to the country to be educated by living in rural poverty”
(People’s Daily 1968).
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health for either cohort.
Hypothesis 2 (selection): Preexisting di↵erences among rustication groups (in terms
of family background) explain the relationship between rustication experience and midlife
health, as well as any cohort variation thereof.
4.2.2 Turning Point (Direct): During Rustication
Alternatively, rustication could serve as a turning point that directly shaped the rusti-
cated youth when they lived in rural areas. Life in rural China was much harder than in
urban areas: housing was inferior by urban standards, basic sanitation measures were
lacking, and employment was largely limited to labor intensive agricultural work. There
are many anecdotal accounts that speak to the hardships the rusticated youth had to
endure in remote mountains or villages (Bonnin and Horko, 2013, 250-254; Deng, 2005).
In a 1978 health survey conducted in Yunnan, for example, a great majority of rusti-
cates were found to have anemia, and almost all surveyed youth su↵ered from stomach
diseases, rheumatoid arthritis, and malnutrition (Deng, 2005, 139).
Cohort might be an important contingency factor, however. Members of leading-
edge CR cohort, given the strict rustication policy then implemented, were more likely
to be sent to remote hinterlands, where hygiene facilities were typically worse, compared
with the environments for members of the trailing-edge CR cohort who were more likely
to go to towns closer to their home cities (Hung and Chiu, 2003).
Hypothesis 3: Members of leading-edge CR cohort were more likely to be sent to rural
areas with inadequate hygiene facilities, compared with those of trailing-edge CR cohort.
A natural corollary from the direct turning-point framing is that, any negative asso-
ciation between rustication and midlife health should be more pronounced for members
of the leading-edge CR cohort than for members of the trailing-edge CR cohort. Fur-
ther, given that hard living conditions may cumulate, those who stayed in rural areas
for a longer period of time (late returners) from the leading-edge CR cohort should have
poorest health later in life.
Hypothesis 4 (direct turning point): Di↵erent rustication experiences (in terms of
destination locations and living conditions) explain the relationship between rustication
experience and midlife health, as well as any cohort variation thereof.
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4.2.3 Turning Point (Indirect): Following Rustication
Another way turning points can alter human lives is through changing the timing and
direction of a series of important life events. The rustication experience may have shaped
health at midlife indirectly, by setting in motion a chain of events in individuals’ lives,
including disrupted education, delayed social role transitions, and dismal structural
opportunities of locating jobs upon returning. I consider several life chances outcomes:
marriage, educational attainment, occupation, and income.
Before returning to their home cities, many rusticated youth refrained from mar-
riage for fear of having to remain in the countryside forever (Chen, 1999; Qian and
Hodson, 2011; Zhou and Hou, 1999). In terms of educational attainment, the rusticated
youth were actually more likely to subsequently (following their return) attain a col-
lege education, compared with urban youth who stayed in cities (Zhou and Hou, 1999;
also see Chapter 2). Such di↵erences in education, however, do not mean that rustica-
tion experience in itself promoted education. Rather, other social processes could be at
work, including the rusticated youth’s higher educational levels prior to being sent down
(Qian and Hodson, 2011; Xie et al., 2008). With respect to occupation, years spent in
rural areas did not contribute to accumulated job skills or enterprise-specific seniority
(Qian and Hodson, 2011), which may have lowered the chances of career promotion for
the rusticated youth. Lin (2013), for example, found that those who were rusticated,
especially late returners (who returned at least 5 years later), are more likely to follow
a “working class, downward” trajectory. A few others, however, show no di↵erence be-
tween the rusticates and the non-rusticates in high-status occupational attainment at
either their first jobs (Meng and Gregory, 2002; Zhou and Hou, 1999) or their midcareer
(Xie et al., 2008).
The extent to which the send-down experience a↵ects subsequent life events could de-
pend on cohort membership. In particular, late returners of the trailing-edge CR cohort,
who did not return until the final years of the rustication policy, should be most ad-
versely a↵ected. In terms of education, college entrance examinations resumed in 1977,
open to all age-eligible youths and favoring academic merits over family background.
An early return would therefore facilitate exam success by having more preparation
time. Those who did not return until the late 1970s, even when they got a permis-
sion to take the exam, were often too busy doing manual work in the fields to make
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adequate preparations for passing the exam (Bonnin and Horko, 2013, 136). Further,
their late return might harm their prospects of locating a good job upon returning to
cities. To some extent, this is a reflection of the fact that the labor market could not
absorb the 8 million rusticated youths who returned within the short period of time
following the demise of the rustication policy. Unlike the other 8 million—mostly from
leading-edge CR cohort—who returned before 1977, these trailing-edge late returners
may have faced a much bleaker labor market, which could have a↵ected their time spent
in unemployment as well as the nature of first job they eventually obtained.
Hypothesis 5: Late returners, especially those from trailing-edge CR cohort, are less
likely to have married and more likely to have lower levels of education and less desirable
jobs (first and current).
Based on the indirect turning-point view, late returners from the trailing edge should
have the poorest health later in life, because their life chances upon returning were
subject to the heaviest disruption.
Hypothesis 6 (indirect turning point): Di↵erent life circumstances (marriage, educa-
tion, occupation) after returning to the cities explain the relationship between rustication
experience and midlife health.
4.3 Data, Measures, and Method
4.3.1 Data and Analytic Sample
I draw on data collected from the 1994 State and Life Chances in Urban China Survey,
covering 20 cities in 6 provinces in mainland China (Zhou and Moen, 2002). This survey
is particularly suitable for my research questions given its life course orientation and
the collection of detailed life history events, including rustication experience, education,
and occupation. The Life Chances survey adopted a multistage sampling procedure to
create a sample consisting of 20 cities that represent a variety of geographic locations
and types of urban economies.
Given the cohort focus, my analytic sample consists of members of the Cultural
Revolution cohort who turned age 19 during the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976). I
further divide it into Leading-Edge CR-Cohort (born 1947-52) and Trailing-Edge CR-
Cohort (born 1953-57), based on their life stages when the Cultural Revolution began
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and when the subsequent rustication policy was launched. The final sample size is 2064.
Table 4.1 provides descriptive statistics for the overall sample by cohort membership
and rustication status.
[Table 4.1 about here]
4.3.2 Measures
Outcomes
Self-reported health. Respondents were asked to rate their health status on a scale from
1 to 10 with 1 being very unhealthy and 10 being very healthy. Self-reported health
has been shown to be a valid measure of health and a reliable predictor of subsequent
survival (Idler and Angel, 1990; Idler and Benyamini, 1997).
Focal Predictors
Cohort distinguishes between leading-edge CR cohort (born 1947-52) and trailing-edge
CR cohort (born 1953-57). The year 1947 corresponds to the birth year of students
who were in their last year of high school at the outbreak of the Cultural Revolution
and 1957 to the birth year of those who graduated from high school at the end of the
revolution.
Rustication status takes into account occurrence and duration of the rustication ex-
perience. Respondents are categorized into three groups: (1) stayers (i.e., those who
did not go to the countryside), (2) early returners (i.e., those sent down who returned
home within 5 years), and (3) late returners (i.e., those sent to rural areas who returned
home at least 5 years later). The five-year cuto↵ has been used in the previous litera-
ture as a meaningful cutting point for the rustication experience (see Lin, 2013; Qian
and Hodson, 2011; Xie et al., 2008; Zhou and Hou, 1999); it is also methodologically
reasonable to ensure early and late returners of approximately equal size.
Explanatory Variables
Family background is a label directly defined by the state and was a critical basis for
political discrimination in the Mao era (1949-76). Before the abolition in 1979 of of-
ficial family class labels, individuals were routinely required to report this label on
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applications for educational enrollment, jobs, and promotions. I reduce the original
12 categories into three groups: (1) Cadre, (2) Working Class, and (3) Intellectual.
I do not use parental education because it cannot capture individuals whose parents
are cadres, but parental education yields similar patterns as the intellectual category
(results available upon request).
Destination areas is dummy coded, di↵erentiating those who were sent to rural areas
and those who were sent to towns. Running water and hygiene facilities assess whether
respondents had access to these facilities when rusticated.
Marital status distinguishes married and non-married respondents. Educational at-
tainment measures respondents’ education as of during the survey: middle school or
less, high school, and associate college or more. Cadres and professionals, both dummy
variables, capture respondents who were cadres or professionals when surveyed—two
high-status occupations in China; they are compared against ordinary workers. Income
is respondents’ total income in 1993; I take the nature log to avoid right-skewness. Work
unit assesses the type of organizations respondents worked as of the survey, consisting
of party/government, public institutes, state-owned enterprises, collective-owned enter-
prises, private enterprises, at school, and unemployed. I experimented with sequence
analysis to capture respondents’ whole history of in and out of di↵erent types of work
units. These patterned sequences, nevertheless, do not seem to vary between cohorts or
explain any health di↵erences by rustication status (not shown; available upon request).
Covariates
In most analyses I control for age, age squared, gender (women = 1), and province
of residence. Educational level before rustication is constructed based on educational
history and the year when respondent was sent to rural areas. For respondents who
stayed in cities, I first calculate the average age when their peers born in the same year
were sent to rural areas, and use that age as an anchor to obtain educational levels for
stayers.
4.3.3 Analytic Strategy
I begin by presenting health di↵erences across groups constructed by rustication sta-
tus/duration and cohort membership. Next, I show di↵erences between these groups in
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characteristics reflecting their before-, during-, and after-rustication experiences, based
on OLS, dichotomous logit or multinomial logit models. Lastly, I determine the most
likely explanation for the observed health di↵erences across groups. Selection is assessed
through propensity-score matching; di↵erential rustication experiences are evaluated by
restricting the sample to the rusticated youth to determine which aspect of rustication
appears to have harmed subsequent health the most; and I add potential mediators (life
chances variables when the rusticates returned home) to see whether after-rustication
experiences are the key.
4.4 Results
4.4.1 Health Di↵erences by Rustication and Cohort Groups
As presented in Table 4.1, self-reported health does not vary across rustication groups
for members of the leading-edge CR cohort. For members of the trailing-edge CR cohort,
however, self-reported health is quite low among those who remained in rural areas for
longer than 5 years (6.7 vs. 7.48 among stayers and 7.2 among early returners, p <
.001).
This cohort variation remains when covariates are included. Table 4.2 shows es-
timates from ordinal logit models predicting self-reported health, first for the overall
sample (Model 1) and then separately by cohort (Models 2-3). There is no di↵erence
in self-reported health between stayers, early returners, and late returners when both
cohorts are combined. For members of the trailing-edge CR cohort, however, a health
disadvantage compared with stayers is observed among those who spent more than 5
years working in rural areas (-.441, p < .05). A post-estimation Wald test further sug-
gests the health gap between late returners and stayers is significantly di↵erent between
leading- and trailing-edge CR cohort (p < .01). How to account for these di↵erences?
Below I examine how these three rustication groups di↵er from each other in terms of
their before-, during-, and after-rustication characteristics, separated by cohort.
[Table 4.2 about here]
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4.4.2 Before Rustication: Family Background
The three rustication groups di↵er from each other even prior to being sent to rural
areas. Table 4.3 presents estimates from multinomial logit models predicting the odds
of being early returners and late returners, respectively, compared with the odds of
never being sent to rural areas. As shown in Model 1, compared with members of the
leading-edge CR cohort, those in the trailing edge are more likely to stay in rural areas
for fewer than 5 years (.366, p < .05). Reflecting the dominant ideology during the
Cultural Revolution, compared with working class children, those born into intellectual
families are significantly more apt to be sent to rural areas and stay there either within
5 years (.559, p < .01) or longer than 5 years (.398, p < .05), as opposed to staying in
cities.
Importantly, cohort membership moderates the role of family background. As evi-
denced by the main e↵ect of “cadre family background” in Model 2, children of cadres
from the leading-edge cohort were hit heavily, being much more likely to be sent to rural
areas than their peers from working-class families (1.160, p < .01). However, as cadres
gradually resumed power following the initial years of the Cultural Revolution, their
children were no longer in a disadvantaged position, as is seen among the trailing-edge
CR cohort (1.160 - 1.231 = -.071, not significant). Taken as a whole, Hypothesis 1
is supported; family background composition by rustication groups di↵ers between the
two cohorts.
[Table 4.3 about here]
4.4.3 During Rustication: Destination Areas and Running Water
Early and late returners seem to di↵er from each other in terms of the locations they
were sent down to, as well as the living conditions of their rustication destination, as
revealed from Model 1 through Model 3 in Table 4.4. In general, compared with early
returners, late returners were more likely to be sent to rural areas as opposed to towns
(1.289, p < .001), and they tended to have lived in places with no hygiene facilities (-
1.062, p < .05). No di↵erences are found for other predictors; neither is there any cohort
variaion. In sum, therefore, late returners su↵ered poorer sent-down living conditions
as compared with their early-returning peers irrespective of cohort membership, even
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as they also remained in rural areas for a longer period of time.
[Table 4.4 about here]
4.4.4 After Rustication: Marital Status, Education, Occupation, and
Work Unit
In terms of subsequent life chances upon returning to cities, no di↵erence in marital
status is observed by rustication status (Model 1 in Table 4.5). There is an apparent
di↵erence, however, in educational attainment between those who were sent to rural
areas and those who were not. As shown in Model 2, compared with stayers, the
rusticates are much more likely to return to school in their later life stages (.465, p <
.05, for early returners, and .395, p < .05, for late returners). As for their educational
attainment as of the survey in 1994, early returners are more likely than stayers to
have a college degree as opposed to a primary school degree (.580, p < .05, Model 3).
Late returners, however, do not di↵er from their peers who stayed in cities in terms of
educational attainment.
[Table 4.5 about here]
The three rustication groups have comparable odds of being cadres or professionals
when surveyed in 1994 (Models 4-5); they also earn similar amounts of money (Model
6). The types of organizations respondents worked in when surveyed in 1994 do not
di↵er by rustication status, except that early returners are less likely to be in school
and more likely to have a paid job (Model 7). Taken as a whole, with the exception of
education, there are few di↵erences across the three rustication groups in terms of their
achievements later in life; neither does cohort membership moderate these relationships.
Hypothesis 5 is therefore not supported.
4.4.5 Putting it All Together
First, given that few subsequent life chances are found to di↵er between the three
rustication groups (Table 4.5), it is not surprising that adding marital status, education,
income, occupation, and work unit does little to explain away the health disadvantage
for late returners of the trailing-edge CR cohort (Table 4.6). The coe cients barely
change regardless of which variables are added or in what order. Therefore, the di↵erent
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life circumstances following rustication do not seem to be the driving force of health
disparities across rustication groups.
[Table 4.6 about here]
Next, I examine whether what happened during rustication mattered for subsequent
health by restricting the sample to rusticates. For members of the trailing-edge CR
cohort, absence of running water when rusticated does not predict early returners’
health (main e↵ect .647, not significant, Model 4), but no running water is associated
with poorer health among late returners (.647 - 1.861 = -1.214, p < .001, Model 4).
This pattern is not observed for members of the leading-edge CR cohort (Model 3). A
lack of running water, therefore, seems to account partly for the health disadvantage of
late returners from the trailing edge.
[Table 4.7 about here]
Last, I apply propensity score technique to address issues related to selection. The
propensity score is generated from a regression on age, gender, family background,
education prior to being sent to rural areas, and province dummies. After matching,
the health disadvantage of late returners from the trailing-edge CR cohort disappears
(-.771, p < .001 before matching; -.404, not significant after matching; Table 4.8).
Disadvantages associated with these individuals that put them in the “treatment” group
in the first place—that is, that sent them down to rural areas and prevented them from
returning home early—therefore, appear to be the main reason why they su↵ered the
worst health when surveyed in 1994.
[Table 4.8 about here]
4.5 Discussion
Almost half a century have passed since the rustication movement of the Cultural Rev-
olution, but not a single study has examined its long-term consequences for midlife
health. Relying on a survey that collected detailed life histories of rustication, educa-
tion, and occupation, this paper reveals several important findings. First, the extent to
which rustication predicts subsequent health is contingent on a combination of duration
spent in rural areas and cohort membership. For the leading-edge CR cohort, midlife
health is independent of rustication status. But a di↵erent pattern is observed for those
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in the trailing edge, with those who spent more than 5 years in rural areas su↵ering
much poorer health compared with stayers. Second, echoing previous literature, I show
considerable selectivity regarding who was sent to rural areas and who was able to return
home within a short amount of time. But I also extend existing studies by demonstrat-
ing another aspect that di↵erentiates early and late returners: late returners are more
likely to be sent to rural areas (as opposed to towns) where basic hygiene facilities were
lacking. However, with the exception of educational attainment, life chances following
their returning home—marital status, income, occupation, and work unit—show little
variation. Third, using propensity score matching, I show that the poor health su↵ered
by late returners from the trailing-edge CR cohort is due to the disadvantages that both
uprooted them and prevented them from returning to home cities early. In addition,
a lack of running water where they were rusticated seems to have exacerbated their
pre-rustication disadvantages.
Two temporal dimensions figure predominantly in this research: historical timing
and duration of time, as evidenced by the finding that the group a✏icted with poor
health are late returners (duration of time) from the trailing-edge CR cohort (historical
timing). Of the two dimensions, duration has received due attention in previous liter-
ature; almost all prior studies distinguished early and late returners (Lin, 2013; Qian
and Hodson, 2011; Xie et al., 2008; Zhou and Hou, 1999). This is reasonable, given that
any disadvantages associated with living in rural areas possibly cumulate over time.
What has been ignored in prior literature, however, is that the Cultural Revolution
cohort is not a homogeneous unit. Although heterogeneity stemming from characteris-
tics such as family background has been studied, less attention has been given to young
people’s di↵erential ages when the Cultural Revolution was initiated and played out.
In the case of rustication, historical timing is expected to matter because it captures
(1) shifting state policies governing who was sent to rural areas, who was able to return
to cities early, as well as their locations of destination, and (2) di↵erential opportunity
structures in getting higher education and obtaining a job after returning to cities. My
findings largely support the first but not the second channel. The composition of stay-
ers, early returners, and late returners—in terms of family background—di↵ers greatly
between leading- and trailing-edge members of the CR cohort, given shifting rustica-
tion policies. Distinguishing cohort membership is therefore essential to capture groups
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located di↵erently in the social hierarchy, even as they belong to the same rustication
group. There are no cohort variations, by contrast, in terms of how rustication is as-
sociated with subsequent educational or occupational attainment. This may have to
do with the general lack of opportunities throughout the Cultural Revolution decade.
Those who came of age during that decade, therefore, were deprived of many oppor-
tunities, whether they were sent down or not, or whether they returned home early or
not.
Another contribution of this paper is to show the relative validity of selection and
turning-point theoretical arguments in the shaping of midlife health for the rusticated
youth. With few exceptions (Xie et al., 2008), previous literature typically frames
rustication as a “turning point” (Chen, 1999; Hung and Chiu, 2003; Qian and Hodson,
2011; Zhou and Hou, 1999) that fundamentally changed life trajectories of those sent
to rural areas in their formative years. What I show, however, is that it is not so much
what occurred following these rusticated youth’s home return as what placed some into
the “late returners” group in the first place that mattered for their health. In other
words, even without the rustication experience, late returners from the trailing-edge CR
cohort may have had poor health in midlife.
This finding has several components that need to be unpacked. First, what exactly
led to the poorer health of the late returners from the trailing-edge CR cohort? In other
words, what are the hidden “third variables” in the selection thesis? As shown, due to
the shifting rustication policies, these individuals tend to have been disadvantaged even
prior to being sent to rural areas. For example, they are most likely to come from
working-class families, the least likely to have parents who were cadres, and the great
majority had not gone to high school before going to the countryside (89%, Table 4.1).
Further, members of this group are the most likely to be sent to rural areas without basic
hygiene facilities (Table 4.4), signaling their disadvantaged position that placed them at
a high risk of being sent to places with unfavorable conditions. Long duration of time
spent in such harsh living conditions thus further magnified existing disadvantages these
children su↵ered before being sent down to the countryside. Therefore, despite the state
portrayal of the rustication policy as a way to eliminate the “three great di↵erences”
between mental and manual labor, between workers and peasants, and between rural
and urban areas, it actually served to reinforce these di↵erences. Social hierarchies of
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advantages/disadvantages, if anything, seem to be reproduced with the facilitation of
the rustication policy.
Second, regardless of cohort membership, the rustication experience does not seem
to matter much for important life chances such as marital status, occupation, income,
and work units in midlife. Regardless of rustication status, children who came of age
during that decade had few opportunities to thrive in their formative years. Many
children who did not go to the countryside stayed at home unemployed. Therefore,
the rusticates may not have lost as much as expected. Third, confirming prior studies
(Zhou and Hou, 1999; Qian and Hodson, 2011), the sent-down experience does appear
to be a turning-point in some other aspects; the rusticated youth are more apt to return
to school, and they have attained higher educational levels as of the survey in 1994
(for early returners). These factors, nevertheless, do not predict midlife health. Taken
together, therefore, the turning-point perspective fails to o↵er a satisfactory explanation
for midlife health because the rustication experience either did not lead to subsequent
di↵erences in life chances (in the case of marital status, occupation, income, and work
units), or if it did, those life chances di↵erences are not important predictors for health
(in the case of educational attainment).
This study has several limitations. First, the survey used in this analysis was con-
ducted in 1994 when members of the Cultural Revolution cohort were in their 40s. A
di↵erent pattern possibly emerges as they move into even later life stages. For example,
the late 1990s witnessed a large-scale economic restructuring that resulted in millions of
workers being laid-o↵. Based on the 2003 Chinese General Social Survey (CGSS), Qian
and Hodson (2011) showed that those who were sent to rural areas were more likely to
retire early. To what extent this unfavorable life event translated into health among the
rusticates, as well as possible cohort variations, is a question that future studies could
examine. It is possible that late returners from the trailing-edge CR cohort are most
adversely a↵ected by such an event, leading to their even worse health. Nevertheless,
the 2003 CGSS did not collect health-related measures to permit an investigation of
this issue. Second, given data limitations, measures related to the rustication experi-
ence (location, running water, hygiene facilities) are crude and are missing for a few
respondents. Nevertheless, this is the only survey that allows us to have a quantitative
perspective regarding “the journey.” I also compared socio-demographic characteristics
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between those who provided measures on rustication experiences and those who did
not, finding these two groups are quite comparable (results available upon request).
Third, self-reported health is a widely used and well-recognized health measure that is
highly predictive of subsequent mortality, but more objective health measures such as
morbidity or mortality are better positioned to address any bias related to self reports.
Fourth, left truncation is an issue this study cannot address. This concerns mortality
selection; no conclusions can be drawn for those who died before the survey data were
collected. Likewise, what happened to the sent-down youth who did not get a chance
to return home is unknown.
Despite these limitations, this study is the first to evaluate any long-term health
consequences of the rustication policy among those who came of age during China’s
Cultural Revolution decade. It points to the importance of understanding human lives
within the contexts of specific historical moments: life chances were socially stratified
during political turmoil, but the particular pattern could vary depending on when in-
dividuals were a↵ected by the historical event. It also illustrates how disadvantaged
family background operated together with harsh living conditions in rural areas and
long duration of time to produce an especially bleak health profile among those who
spent a long period of their youth in rural areas. As these people moved into even later
life stages, it is vital to examine their living standards and design policies accordingly
to compensate for their early-life adversity due to the state intervention.
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Table 4.1: Descriptive Statistics for the Chinese Cultural Revolution (CR) Cohort,
1994 State and Life Chances in Urban China Survey
!
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Table 4.2: Estimates from Ordinal Logit Models Predicting Self-Reported Health,
1994 State and Life Chances in Urban China Survey
!
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Table 4.3: Multinomial Logit Models Predicting Rustication Status (Ref. = Stayers),
1994 State and Life Chances in Urban China Survey
!
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Table 4.4: Estimates from Logit Models Predicting Rustication Experiences (restricted
to respondents who were once sent to rural areas), 1994 State and Life Chances in
Urban China Survey
!
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Table 4.5: Estimates from OLS, Binary and Multinomial Logit Models Predicting
Potential Mediators, 1994 State and Life Chances in Urban China Survey
!
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Table 4.5 (cont.)
!
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Table 4.6: Estimates from Ordinal Logit Models Predicting Self-Reported Health with
Potential Mediators, 1994 State and Life Chances in Urban China Survey
!
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Table 4.7: Estimates from Ordinal Logit Models Predicting Self-Reported Health
(restricted to respondents who were once sent to rural areas), 1994 State and Life
Chances in Urban China Survey
!
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Table 4.8: ”E↵ects” of Rustication before and after Propensity Score Matching, by
Cohort, 1994 State and Life Chances in Urban China Survey
!
Chapter 5
Conclusions
Return to the puzzle introduced in the opening chapter: Despite disrupted education
and days of harsh living in rural areas, members of the Cultural Revolution cohort do
not su↵er worse health in their later lives (see Figure 1.2). Why is this the case? In this
closing chapter, I first answer this intriguing question from three angles, drawing on
findings from my analytic chapters. Next, I discuss the contribution of this dissertation,
followed by limitations that future research could attend to. This chapter ends with a
reflection on research directions as well as implications for health-related policies.
5.1 Back to the Puzzle
That members of the Cultural Revolution cohort lost a chance to receive higher educa-
tion on time is well studied (e.g., Deng and Treiman, 1997; Pepper, 1991; Unger, 1982).
But a “return to school” trend has been missed by previous literature on the China ex-
perience. As revealed in Chapter 2, life courses are not “set” early in life, but members
of the Cultural Revolution cohort reverse early adversities by returning to college on
a much larger scale compared to adjacent cohorts. Further, this important life-course
turning point, returning to school, was more available to the adult children whose par-
ents were more educated, the same adult children who were targeted mostly harshly
during the Cultural Revolution. Consequently, the negative relationship as denoted by
Arrow 1 in Figure 1.1 is less severe than what previous studies have suggested. Never-
theless, returning to school does not appear to matter for subsequent health, suggesting
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the need for a more thorough examination of the relationship between education and
health in China.
Given the particular institutional arrangement of China, as shown in Chapter 3,
there is a two-career path—professional or administrative occupations—into the urban
Chinese elite with college education a persistently vital prerequisite for a professional
position even as party membership is always a prerequisite for top administrative posts
(Dickson and Rublee, 2000; Walder, 1995; Walder et al., 2000). In terms of access
to a range of flexible resources, those with both educational and political credentials
(the dual elite) enjoy a noticeable advantage over those with only a college degree (the
education-only elite) (Bian, 2002; Li and Walder, 2001; Walder et al., 2000). By compar-
ing their health profiles using three cross-sectional data over a span of almost 20 years
(1994-2010), I show that the dual elite—regardless of the order in which they received
each credential (the incorporated dual elite, path of schooling then party membership,
and the sponsored dual elite, path of party membership then schooling)—enjoy a health
advantage over the education-only elite in all three surveys. In other words, a college
degree in itself is not su cient; only when coupled with party a liation is it predictive
of health in China. In Figure 1.1, therefore, Arrow 2 should be viewed contextually: the
extent to which health benefits of education can be realized depends on particular insti-
tutional and political circumstances, as marked by a connection to the state apparatus
in the case of China.
Lastly, Chapter 4 demonstrates that the rustication policy, despite disrupting the
life courses of those sent to rural areas during their formative years, left no mark on
the subsequent health of most of the rusticates. The only group adversely a↵ected
are members of the trailing-edge Cultural Revolution cohort (born 1953 to 1957) who
stayed in rural areas for more than five years (“late returners”). This finding is largely a
reflection of the shifting rustication policies as implemented during the Cultural Revo-
lution. Whereas in the early period (1967-71), implementation of the rustication policy
was stringent, social stratification again emerged as the political tides subsided. Among
the leading-edge Cultural Revolution cohort, therefore, selection based on family back-
ground is negligible, thereby contributing to the lack of variation in health by rustication
status. A di↵erent pattern is observed for the trailing-edge Cultural Revolution cohort;
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as cadres gradually resumed their power in later stages of the Cultural Revolution, chil-
dren pulled in to rural areas and staying there for a long time were more apt to come
from disadvantaged families. Once these pre-rustication di↵erences are taken into ac-
count through propensity score matching, the poorer health of late returners from the
trailing edge is no longer significant. Therefore, it is primarily selection, in terms of who
was sent to and who was able to return early from rural areas, that explains health dif-
ferentials by cohort and rustication status. Arrow 4 in Figure 1.1, consequently, largely
reflects a spurious correlation.
5.2 Contribution 1: Theorizing Institutional Arrangements
in the Production and Perpetuation of the SES Gra-
dient in Health
My findings cast doubts on the universal role of education in structuring health dispar-
ities. Particular institutional arrangements, as in the case of China, figure prominently
in determining the educational gradient in health. Although Lutfey and Freese have in
various places (Freese and Lutfey, 2011; Lutfey and Freese, 2005) highlighted the role of
the dynamic actions of institutions in the production of health disparities, they mostly
refer to the institution of the medicine, wherein, for example, diagnoses and treatments
are made not entirely based on actual diseases but taking into account patients’ spe-
cific socioeconomic status. The “institutional arrangements” used in my dissertation, in
comparison, is more general, referring to the whole set of “who gets what” rules, which
di↵ers most sharply between market and socialist societies.
In industrialized market societies, the market plays a central role in allocating re-
sources; education, as a signal of human capital and productivity, is consequently re-
warded and associated with a wide range of flexible and desirable resources beneficial
for health. This is the case for both “liberal” countries such as the United States (Adler
et al., 1994; Elo and Preston, 1996; Kitagawa and Hauser, 1973; Link and Phelan, 1995;
Meara et al., 2008; Mirowsky and Ross, 2003; Warren, 2009) and countries where the
welfare state plays an active role in resource redistribution such as the Nordic nations
(Olafsdottir, 2007).
However, the importance of education for getting ahead is not necessarily a fixed
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feature of society. In China’s particular macro-political environment, it is the state
and the Communist Party—rather than the market—that distribute and allocate re-
sources (Bian, 2002; Nee, 1989, 1996; Walder et al., 2000; Zhou, 2010; Zhou et al., 1996).
State/party policies can even change the very meaning of “resources,” the most extreme
case being the Cultural Revolution decade when parental education was considered a
liability rather than an asset (Deng and Treiman, 1997; Unger, 1982; Zhou and Hou,
1999). Even with the ending of the Cultural Revolution and the burgeoning economic
reform in urban China, education has yet to become the fundamental force shaping life
chances it is in Western societies (Bian and Logan, 1996; Walder, 1996; Zhou, 2000).
What turns out to play a more important role in structuring health disparities than
education is party a liation, an indicator of one’s loyalty to and connection with the
state/party apparatus.
These findings are not only relevant to the Chinese population, but shed light on
why education is so persistently associated with health in general. Among the three
dominant theoretical perspectives tested in Chapter 3: spurious correlation, human cap-
ital, and fundamental cause theory, my findings are most consistent with fundamental
cause theory but also extend this theory by highlighting the importance of specifying
concrete institutional contexts. The meaning of education and its health implications
could well exhibit di↵erent patterns in societies with alternative institutional arrange-
ments. Accordingly, there is no way to map education and wellbeing outcomes without
locating individuals in socially and historically bounded life course contexts; recogniz-
ing variations by social contexts and historical timing is essential to understanding the
social production of life chances outcomes, including health.
5.3 Contribution 2: Historical Timing and Human Agency
The role of social disruptions in shaping individual life chances, and how individuals
resist these external forces to construct their own destinies, are enduring themes of
life course research. One contribution of this dissertation is to give substance to the
notion that individuals’ agentic decisions are shaped by historical shifts in opportunity
and motivation, as well as collective biography. Cohort membership is a good way to
capture these variations.
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When the Cultural Revolution closed the door for a whole cohort to attend college
or when it sent millions of youth to do the manual labor in rural areas, it was not the
end of the story. This can be seen in the contrast between the Cultural Revolution
cohort and the cohorts immediately before and after it in decisions to return to school,
with members of the Cultural Revolution cohort most likely to compensate for their
limited early-life human capital by going back to school at a much later life stage. This
cohort di↵erence reflects their distinct early-life educational experiences, the shifting
structural opportunities of adult education, and the rising importance of education in
the Chinese job market since the 1980s. Likewise, when uprooted to the countryside,
the rusticates exhibited considerable human agency in leaving, including by admission
to college and joining the People’s Liberation Army. Notably, however, the extent to
which human agency can be successfully called upon is stratified, with those possessing
more resources more likely to do so. For example, those born into intellectual families
were more likely to return to school when their education was disrupted early in life;
children of cadres were also in a much better position to use college or the army as a
way to leave the countryside, pointing to the unevenness of catching up and fighting
against adversity.
5.4 Limitations
Although this study has a↵orded me the opportunity to examine relationships between
education, rustication, and health among three Chinese cohorts, there are important
caveats for this research. First, due to data limitation, I am unable to examine changes
in health. Trajectories of health may well di↵er from levels of health measured at a
given time point. Second, health is a broad concept encompassing indicators such as
mortality, morbidity, mental wellbeing, health behaviors, etc. What I have focused on
is self-reported health, a reliable predictor of subsequent mortality. But other health
measures are necessary to understand actual disease burden or subjective wellbeing pat-
terns. Third, more detailed measures and better study designs are needed to understand
concrete mechanisms in the social structuring of health inequalities. Why exactly, for
example, do members of the education-only elite lag behind those of the dual elite in
health? Answers to such questions will help conceive and devise interventions to fight
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health disparities. Fourth, left truncation is an issue this study cannot address. This
concerns mortality selection; no conclusions can be drawn for those who died before the
survey data were collected. Likewise, what happened to the sent-down youth who did
not get a chance to return home is unknown.
5.5 Implications for Future Research and Policies
One potentially fruitful area is to extend the scope of the current study, spatially and
temporally. For example, what would the educational gradient in health look like for
post-Communist countries as they transition from state socialist to market societies?
Do alternative transition trajectories matter (Walder, 2003)? Comparative studies with
detailed institutional analysis will o↵er insights on these important questions. Similarly,
this study examines three Chinese cohorts who entered the labor market before the
intensification of the economic reform in urban China (since 1992). As China has
experienced great institutional restructuring over the past few decades, to what extent
the patterns detected in this research are generalizable to even more recent Chinese
cohorts is an empirical question awaiting for future analysis.
A second direction is to deepen our understanding regarding the educational gradient
in health by examining the role of (biographical) timing of education. My study shows
that the timing of education in individual biographies does not matter for subsequent
health. This is in contrast with previous research showing that schooling timing matters
(for the outcome of income, see Elman and O’Rand 2004; Light 1995; Monks 1997),
drawing on evidence from advanced societies. Part of the reason for the conflicting
findings is that many of the Chinese who returned to college are the sponsored dual
elite, sent by the party to “credential up” party personnel. In other words, timing of
education is confounded with advantaged social positions in the China case. A better
design to disentangle these two will be beneficial, in light of the global trend that more
and more people go back to school in the hopes of improve their life chances. Further,
sponsored return-to-school also exists in Western countries, used by organizations to
reward and train their valued employees. To what extent the associated health benefits
are the same as observed in China would be another interesting topic to investigate.
Third, future studies are needed to gaining a broader and deeper understanding of
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the concrete mechanisms generating health inequalities by socioeconomic status. The
question of “how” has been unfortunately neglected given the burgeoning interest in
identifying “causal e↵ects.” As argued before, e↵ects occur in specific contexts and
through specific mechanisms. To develop successful interventions, an understanding of
generalizable mechanisms and contextual e↵ects is essential.
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